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PROC EDURE-IMMIGRATION-INAPPLICABIL-

ITY

OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT TO ADJUDICATIONS BEFORE THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS--Giam-

banco v. INS, 531 F.2d 141 (3d Cir. 1976); Cisternas-Estay v.
INS, 531 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1976).
Giuseppe Giambanco, a citizen of Italy, entered the United
States on a visitor for pleasure visa.' According to the terms of his
visa, Giambanco was authorized to remain in this country only for a
period of one year. 2 He failed to leave when the visa expired, 3 and
on April 26, 1971, in an uncontested hearing 4 before a special inquiry
officer of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (Service or
1 Giambanco v. INS, 531 F.2d 141, 142 (3d Cir. 1976). The Immigration and Nationality Act (I.N.A.), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), denominates that
class of aliens known as visitors for business or pleasure. (Throughout this Note, citations to the Immigration and Nationality Act will give the I.N.A. section along with a
parallel citation to the United States Code.) This "nonimmigrant alie[n]," I.N.A.
§ 101(a)(15), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) (1970), is considered to be one with a permanent
foreign residence "which he has no intention of abandoning and who [has come to] the
United States temporarily for business or" personal reasons. Id. § 101(a)(15)(B), 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(B) (1970); see 22 C.F.R. § 41.25(a)-(c) (1976). Visa regulations are
not located in the section of the Code of Federal Regulations relating to title 8 of the
United States Code; rather, they may be found at 22 C.F.R. §§ 41-42 (1976) and 29
C.F.R. § 60 (1976).
2 Giambanco v. INS, 531 F.2d 141, 142 (3d Cir. 1976).
3 Id. There is nothing in the administrative record of the deportation proceedings,
the briefs of the respective parties, or the decision of the court which would tend to
shed light on the reasons why Giambanco overstayed his visa. The issue of whether he
possessed a bona fide intent to remain for a short time as a visitor or was a mala fide
nonimmigrant-one with a preconceived plan to overstay, formulated prior to entry
-was not discussed. This question is of more than passing interest since, Linder the
decision of Castillo v. INS, 350 F.2d 1, 3-4 (9th Cir. 1965), the Immigration and
Naturalization Service may make use of an intent to overstay a visa to deny the discretionary relief of adjustment of status under I.N.A. § 245(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (1970).
See Ameeriar v. INS, 438 F.2d 1028, 1032, 1033 n.6 (3d Cir. 1971) (preconceived intent
to evade normal consular procedures); Tonga, 12 I. & N. Dec. 212, 214 (B.I.A. 1967)
(sale of business before entry indicative of intent to remain); Rubio-Vargas, 11 I. & N.
Dec. 167, 169 (B.I.A. 1965) (intent to remain with permanent-citizen-wife); Azmitia, 10
I. & N. Dec. 774, 775 (Acting Regional Comm'r 1964) (ingenuous admission of intent to
remain within the United States). It is possible that this factor will affect the eventual
outcome of the Giambanco case, since the cause was remanded to the Board of Immigration Appeals for action consistent with the court's opinion. Giambanco v. INS, 531
F.2d 141, 149 (3d Cir. 1976).
4
The uncontested hearing procedure is a variant of I.N.A. § 242(b), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b) (1970). Compare id. with 8 C.F.R. § 242.16(a)-(c) (1976). Such hearings are
conducted by a special inquiry officer (or "immigration judge"), id. § 1.1(1), whose pow-
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INS), 5 he admitted his deportability. 6 In lieu of immediate deportation, however, Giambanco was granted one month's time during
7
which he could depart voluntarily.
ers are delineated in the body of the statute itself and in the regulations which give
operational effect to its dictates. I.N.A. § 101(b)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4) (1970); 8 C.F.R.
§§ 1.1(/), 242.8 (1976). Under the regulation governing these hearings, if an alien admits
the factual allegations contained in the order to show cause by which the Immigration
and Naturalization Service initiates the deportation process, the special inquiry officer is
free to determine that the charges against the alien have been established. Id.
§ 24 2 .16(a)-(b). Since the facts have been stipulated there need not be any presentation
or rebuttal of evidence, and the officer's sole remaining duty is to apply the law to the
particular circumstances of the case and grant whatever discretionary relief he deems
warranted. See id. §§ 242.16, 244.1. The salient procedural distinction between contested and uncontested hearings is that in the former, the special inquiry officer is compelled by regulation to appoint a "trial attorney" to present the government's case. Id.
§ 24 2 .16(c). Even contested hearings, despite their quasi-criminal nature, are procedurally analogous to civil trials. See generally Note, Resident Aliens and Due Process:
Anatomy of a Deportation, 8 VILL. L. REV. 566, 576-85 (1963). Therefore, although the
alien is permitted to be represented by counsel, he must bear the expense himself.
I.N.A. § 242(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1970); 8 C.F.R. § 242.16(a) (1976); see Martin-Mendoza v. INS, 499 F.2d 918, 922 (9th Cir. 1974) (although an alien may be represented by counsel in deportation proceedings, this is not an absolute right which must be
provided at government expense), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1113 (1975). But see United
States ex rel. Castro-Lonzan v. Zimmerman, 94 F. Supp. 22, 25-26 (E.D. Pa. 1950). See
generally Comment, Deportation and the Right to Counsel, 11 HARV. INT'L L.J. 177
(1970); Comment, Due Process And Deportation-IsThere a Right to Assigned Counsel?, 8 U.C.D.L. REV. 289 (1975).
5 It is the responsibility of the Attorney General to enforce all laws relating to exclusion or deportation. I.N.A. § 103(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1970). Pursuant to permission granted him in section 103(a), he has delegated these duties to the Immigration
and Naturalization Service. 8 C.F.R. §§ 2.1, 103.1 (1976). For a brief description of the
operation of the Service, see J. WASSERMAN,

IMMIGRATION

LAW AND PRACTICE 7-17

(2d ed. 1973). The following federal agencies play relatively minor roles in execution
of the immigration laws: (1) Department of Labor, see I.N.A. § 212(a)(14), 8 U.S.C.
§ 118 2(a)(14) (1970); 29 C.F.R. § 60.1-.6 (1976); (2) Department of State, see I.N.A.
§§ 104-105, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1104-1105 (1970); (3) Public Health Service, see I.N.A.
§§ 234, 236(d), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1224, 1226(d) (1970); 42 U.S.C. § 252 (1970); 8 C.F.R. § 232.1
(1976); 42 C.F.R. § 34.1-.14 (1976).
6 Giambanco v. INS, 531 F.2d 141, 142 (3d Cir. 1976). Giambanco admitted deportability (as defined in I.N.A. § 241(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 12 51(a)(2) (1970)) in that he overstayed the time period permitted by his visa. 531 F.2d at 142.
Giambanco v. INS, 531 F.2d 141, 142 (3d Cir. 1976). Since it was possible that
Giambanco might once again fail to depart voluntarily, the INS concurrently issued an
alternate order of deportation. Id.
Under 8 C.F.R. § 244.1 (1976), a special inquiry officer has discretionary power to
authorize voluntary departure in lieu of an order of deportation. Id.; see I.N.A. § 244(e),
8 U.S.C. § 12 54(e) (1970). Eligibility is established by fulfilling the requirements of
I.N.A. § 242, 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (1970). The option of voluntary departure is clearly preferable to the alien since it is not strictly considered a deportation. 8 C.F.R. § 243.5 (1976).
Exercising this option allows the alien to choose his destination, rather than having one
imposed upon him. It also may increase the possibility of his reentry into the United
States and in addition speed up the process leading to his eventual return. See, e.g.,
I.N.A. § 212(a)(17), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(17) (1970); 2 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IM-
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Failing to leave within the month, he entered into a marriage
with a United States citizen which was later determined to be part of
a conspiracy "to defraud the United States to obtain a permanent
residence visa. '"" Following Giambanco's plea of guilty to a criminal
conspiracy charge, 9 the trial judge granted his motion to recommend
to the INS that the conviction not be the basis for any future deportation proceedings. 10
Shortly thereafter, Giambanco divorced his first wife and married
the citizen-daughter of one of his co-conspirators in the original
fraud." Based upon his second wife's American citizenship, he
moved to reopen the prior deportation proceeding by filing concurrent applications:1 2 one, under section 245 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (I.N.A.), l3 for "an adjustment of [his] status to that of
MIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 7.2a (rev. ed. 1976).
8 Giambanco v. INS, 531 F.2d 141, 142 (3d Cir. 1976). For a general discussion of
the issue of fraudulent marriages, see Comment, Defense of Sham Marriage Deportations, 8 U.C.D.L. REv. 309 (1975).
9 Giambanco v. INS, 531 F.2d 141, 142 (3d Cir. 1976).
10 Id. at 142-43. The trial judge suspended the sentence and placed Giambanco on
probation for two years. Id. at 142.
I.N.A. § 241(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4) (1970), provides that an alien who has committed "a crime involving moral turpitude within five years after entry" is considered
automatically deportable. Under section 241(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(2) (1970), however, automatic deportability should not apply if the trial court recommends to the Attorney General that such conviction not be the basis of a deportation order. Upon the
defendant's request for such relief, notice must first be given to the INS which may
then appear at the hearing in order to advise the judge of the ramifications which his
order may have on the present and future status of the alien. This procedure is considered direct notice to the Attorney General. 8 C.F.R. § 241.1 (1976).
The classification of an individual act as one "involving moral turpitude is a Federal question" uncontrolled by any state determination as to the nature of the act. See
Wyngaard v. Rogers, 187 F. Supp. 527, 528 (D.D.C. 1960), aff'd sub nom. Wyngaard v.
Kennedy, 295 F.2d 184, 185 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 926 (1961).
In Giambanco's subsequent appeal, the Third Circuit majority largely concerned
itself with the issue of the weight to be accorded by the INS to the trial judge's recommendation. See Giambanco v. INS, 531 F.2d 141, 145-49 (3d Cir. 1976).
11 Giambanco v. INS, 531 F.2d 141, 143 (3d Cir. 1976).
12 Id. Petitions for reopening or reconsidering deportation orders are provided for in
8 C.F.R. §§ 103.5, 242.22 (1976). These regulations allow for consideration of new matters arising after the original hearing, but they mandate that no stay of execution of the
deportation order will be granted unless the Service, in its discretion, so orders. Id. In
Giambanco's case, the officer exercised his discretion and granted a stay of deportation.
See Giambanco v. INS, 531 F.2d 141, 143 (3d Cir. 1976).
13 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1970). The I.N.A. contemplates an adjustment of the status of an
alien, upon application, if he
(1) . . . makes an application for such adjustment, (2) . . . is eligible to receive

an immigrant visa and is admissible to the United States for permanent residence, and (3) an immigrant visa is immediately available to him at the time his
application is approved.
I.N.A. § 245(a)(1)--(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a)(1)-(3) (1970).
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a permanent resident,' 4 and another, under section 212(h), 1 5 for a
"waiver of a ground of excludability.' 1 6 As requested, "the hearing
was reopened," but both applications were denied.' 7 A subsequent
"petition for review to the Board of Immigration Appeals [Board or
B.I.A.] was dismissed."' 8
Another deportation case, decided at the same time, involved
Julio and Doris Cisternas-Estay, Chilean citizens who entered the
United States on visitor for pleasure visas in March of 1971.19 Six
months later they applied for asylum, claiming that the government
of then Chilean President Salvatore Allende-Gossens "would persecute them on their return to Chile." 20 Several months after the fall of
14

Giambanco v. INS, 531 F.2d 141, 143 (3d Cir. 1976).

15 I.N.A. § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (1970). Bearing upon the ultimate question of

admissibility is section 217(a)(9), which provides that an alien convicted of a crime of
moral turpitude is ineligible to receive an immigrant visa. Id. § 217(a)(9), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(9) (1970); see note 10 supra. Such a person is considered excludable and foreclosed from an adjustment of status. Although Giambanco was considered to be an excludable alien, he could petition for a waiver of that status pursuant to section 212(h).
That section controls section 245 on ineligibility, preventing it from becoming operative
when the spouse of a United States citizen is involved. Id. § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)
(1970).
16 Giambanco v. INS, 531 F.2d 141, 143 (3d Cir. 1976).
17 Id. A hearing officer's denial of an immigrant's petition is the end result of a
process based on virtually "unfettered discretion." Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 354
(1956). Despite the language of I.N.A. § 245(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (1970), setting forth
the various conditions for eligibility, aliens putatively eligible under the statute must, in
addition to satisfying its prerequisites, also convince a special inquiry officer of their
worthiness. The officer's final decision rests on his balancing of the equities in each
case. See United States ex rel. Hintopoulos v. Shaughnessy, 353 U.S. 72, 77 (1957).
Unfortunately for both the alien, who is seeking to attack the use of discretion, and
for the special inquiry officer, who is looking for guidelines, there is an absence of
meaningful administrative standards to guide the exercise of discretion. See Jarecha v.
INS, 417 F.2d 220, 223 (5th Cir. 1969); Goon Wing Wah v. INS, 386 F.2d 292, 294 (1st
Cir. 1967); Chen v. Foley, 385 F.2d 929, 934 (6th Cir. 1967); Castillo v. INS, 350 F.2d 1,
3 (9th Cir. 1965).
18 Giambanco v. INS, 531 F.2d 141, 143 (3d Cir. 1976).
19 Cisternas-Estay v. INS, 531 F.2d 155, 157 (3d Cir. 1976). The government alleged
that at the time of entry, the Cisternas-Estays utilized passports indicating that they
were single persons rather than reflecting their true status as a married couple. Id. at
157 & n.1.
20 Id. at 157. Although the court referred to the Cisternas-Estays' problem with the
Allende government as being "unspecified," id., the problem apparently originated as
the result of anti-Allende statements made by Mr. Cisternas-Estay following a speech
given by Allende at his school. The petitioners feared political retribution as a result
of these and other antigovernment statements. See Certified Administrative Record
at 49-50, Cisternas-Estay v. INS, 531 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1976) (transcript of hearing
before the immigration judge) [hereinafter cited as Record].
The possibility of political asylum is provided for in I.N.A. § 243(h), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1253(h) (1970), which states that
• . . [t]he Attorney General is authorized to withhold deportation of any
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the Allende government, and approximately two and one-half years
after the application had been filed, their request was denied by the
Service. 21 Subsequently, their counsel called a press conference during which Mr. Cisternas-Estay read a prepared statement attacking
the succeeding Chilean government for its abrogation of personal
freedoms. 2 2 During the ensuing deportation hearing in which they
admitted deportability, the Cisternas-Estays introduced this statement into evidence, again seeking a discretionary grant of political
asylum. 2 3 The special inquiry officer denied this application for the
withholding of deportation, 2 4 and their appeal to the Board was
dismissed.25
Both Giambanco and the Cisternas-Estays filed appeals from
their respective B.I.A. dismissals to the Third Circuit court of
appeals2 6 which set the cases for argument in tandem. Uniting these
alien within the United States to any country in which in his opinion the alien
would be subject to persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion and for such period of time as he deems to be necessary for such reason.
See also 8 C.F.R. §§ 108.1-.2 (1976).
21 See Cisternas-Estay v. INS, 531 F.2d 155, 157 (3d Cir. 1976). It is questionable
why the application for asylum remained active with no disposition for so long a period
of time.
22 Id. Mr. Cisternas-Estay made the following statement:
It is with deep regret that I must make this statement. My family fled from
Communist Chile three years ago and I had hoped that a Democratic form of
Government would be restored. This is not the case, as the rights to free
speech, press and political activity have been destroyed by the Military government.
My family and I are now seeking refuge in the United States of America.
Record, supra note 20, at 60.
23 Cisternas-Estay v. INS, 531 F.2d 155, 157-58 (3d Cir. 1976). For the text of I.N.A.
§ 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1970), pertaining to the Attorney General's authority to
grant political asylum, see note 20 supra.
24 Cisternas-Estay v. INS, 531 F.2d 155, 158 (3d Cir. 1976). The materials placed
into evidence in support of the application for the withholding of deportation all related
to Mr. Cisternas-Estay, since his wife's claim was derivative, being "entirely dependent
upon that of" her husband. Id. at 157 n.2. The special inquiry officer determined that
Mr. Cisternas-Estay had made only one statement condemning the ruling junta and that
statement had never been published or circulated to others outside of those few persons
in attendence at the press conference. Record, supra note 20, at 28-29. This showing
was therefore insufficient to discharge the burden of proof as to the probabilities of
potential persecution which are required under 8 C.F.R. § 242.1 7 (c) (1976). See, e.g.,
MacCaud v. INS, 500 F.2d 355, 359 nn.7-8 (2d Cir. 1974); Khalil v. District Director,
457 F.2d 1276, 1277 (9th Cir. 1972); Shkukani v. INS, 435 F.2d 1378, 1380 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 403 U.S. 920 (1971); Cheng Kai Fu v. INS, 386 F.2d 750, 753 (2d Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1003 (1968).
25 Cisternas-Estay v. INS, 531 F.2d 155, 158 (3d Cir. 1976). The appeal was dismissed for virtually the same reasons as those expressed by the special inquiry officer
sitting below. Compare id. with Record, supra note 20, at 28-29.
26 Giambanco v. INS, 531 F.2d 141, 142 (3d Cir. 1976); Cisternas-Estay v. INS, 531
F.2d 155, 158 (3d Cir. 1976).
Giambanco's wife, subsequent to the Board's initial decision, had given birth to
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factually dissimilar cases was a broad procedural issue: Do the hearing requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1966
(A.P.A.) 2 7 apply to adjudications before the Board of Immigration
Appeals?2 8 More specifically, the court addressed itself to the question of whether the mandatory disqualification provisions of section
5(c) of the A.P.A. 29 apply to the individual Board members3 0 who, in
their citizen-child. In light of this fact, Giambanco filed a motion of remand asking the
court of appeals to permit reconsideration of his case by the Board. See Giambanco v.
INS, 531 F.2d at 143. The court believed that a grant of the motion was warranted, but
went on to decide the case since the legal issues were of such importance as to demandl
a resolution "before any new proceeding went forward." Id. at 149.
27 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-576, 701, 704-706 (1970 & Supp. V 1975); 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 702-703
(West Curi. Supp. 1977).
28 Giambanco v. INS, 531 F.2d 141, 143 (3d Cir. 1976); Cisternas-Estay v. INS, 531
F.2d 155, 156 (3d Cir. 1976).
In both Giambanco and Cisternas-Esta!,the majority addressed itself to additional
issues which the dissent did not choose to discuss. Compare Giambanco v. INS, 531
F.2d at 145-49 and Cisternas-Estay v. INS, 531 F.2d at 159-60 with Giambanco v. INS,
531 F.2d at 149-55 (dissenting opinion) and Cisternas-Estay v. INS, 531 F.2d at 160-66
(dissenting opinion). The majority in Giambanco perceived the second question of law
as a more difficult problem since it was "one of first impression in [the] circuit." 531
F.2d at 149.
Examination of the primary briefs of the respective parties reveals that they each
perceived the issue of the disqualification of Board members as being basically a due
process question, rather than being a violation of the terms of the A.P.A. Brief for
Petitioner at 7-9, Giambanco v. INS, 531 F.2d 141 (3d Cir. 1976) [hereinafter cited as
Giambanco Brief for Petitioner]; Brief for Respondent at 9-10, Giambanco v. INS, 531
F.2d 141 (3d Cir. 1976) [hereinafter cited as Giarnbanco Brief for Respondent]; Brief
for Petitioners at 7-8, Cisternas-Estay v. INS, 531 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1976). In the
Cisternas-Estays' reply brief, however, there is a passing reference to the federal recusal
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1970), and to section 5(d) of the A.P.A., 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)
(1970), although no attempt was made either to distinguish between these two statutes
or to articulate any further the question of their applicability. Reply Brief for Petitioners
at 3, Cisternas-Estay v. INS, 531 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1976). For a detailed examination of
the federal recusal statute and its construction by the federal courts, see Comment, Disqualification of Federal District Judges-Problems and Proposals, 7 SETON HALL L.
REV. 612 (1976).
29 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(2) (1970). This provision of the A.P.A. states that
[t]he employee who presides at the reception of evidence pursuant to section 556 of this title shall make the recommended decision or initial decision
required by section 557 of this title, unless he becomes unavailable to the
agency. Except to the extent required for the disposition of ex parte matters as
authorized by law, such an employee may not(2) be responsible to or subject to the supervision or direction of an
employee or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions for an agency.
An employee or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions for an agency in a case may not, in that or a factually related case,
participate or advise in the decision, recommended decision, or agency review
pursuant to section 557 of this title ....
Id.

30 Giambanco v. INS, 531 F.2d 141, 143 (3d Cir. 1976); Cisternas-Estay v. INS, 531
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both cases, had decided the deportation appeals despite their previ31
ous appearances as counsel for the Service.
Under section 242(b) of the I.N.A., 3 2 the Attorney General is
33
vested with ultimate responsibility for all final deportation orders.
In order to carry out this function, he established the B.I.A. and
delegated to it the power to review decisions by the special inquiry
officer. 34 In Giambanco v. INS, 35 the court found this review procedure to be "an integral part of [a] section 242" determination of
deportation. 36 Furthermore, since the Supreme Court in Marcello v.
F.2d 155, 156 (3d Cir. 1976). The court, sua sponte, framed the issue in this manner.
Giambanco v. INS, 531 F.2d at 143; Cisternas-Estay v. INS, 531 F.2d at 156.
31 Giambanco v. INS, 531 F.2d 141, 143 (3d Cir. 1976); Cisternas-Estay v. INS, 531
F.2d 155, 158 (3d Cir. 1976).
During the period in which the Giambanco and Cisternas-Estay proceedings were
before the special inquiry officer, and later at oral argument before the B.I.A., Board
members Irving Appleman and David Milhollan had been of counsel to the Service.
Their appointments to the Board came after the oral arguments had been heard but
before any final decisions had been rendered. Giambanco v. INS, 531 F.2d at 143; see
Cisternas-Estay v. INS, 531 F.2d at 158. Furthermore, one of these recent appointees
had been the superior of the trial attorney who had argued the Giambanco appeal.
Giambanco v. INS, 531 F.2d at 143.
The INS presented affidavits from the two Board members and the final attorney
which affirmed that until the moment that the votes were actually cast, no discussions
about the case had taken place among them. Giambanco Brief for Petitioner, supra
note 28, exhibits A-C. The Cisternas-Estay appeal had been prosecuted by Irving Appleman, who did disqualify himself from participation in the Board's decision. In contrast, Mr. Milhollan again denied any participation in the case prior to his appointment
and refused to disqualify himself. Brief for Respondent, exhibits A-B, Cisternas-Estay
v. INS, 531 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1976).
No provisions have been made either by the Attorney General or by the Board itself
as to mandatory or voluntary disqualification of Board members from decisions in which
there might be a potential conflict of interest. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.1-.8 (1976).
32 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1970). Section 242(b) provides in pertinent part that "[i]n any
case in which an alien is ordered deported from the United States under the provisions
of this chapter, or of any other law or treaty, the decision of the Attorney General shall
be final." Id.
33 Id.
34 Giambanco v. INS, 531 F.2d 141, 144 (3d Cir. 1976).
35 531 F.2d 141 (3d Cir. 1976).
36 Id.
at 144. The court viewed section 242(b)-(c) of the I.N.A., 8 U.S.C. §
1252(b)-(c) (1970), as the source of the Attorney General's power to create the Board.
531 F.2d at 144. Neither of these sections, however, speaks in terms of the Attorney
General's power to delegate the duties imposed on him by those sections. See I.N.A.
§ 242(b)(4), (c), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4), (c) (1970). By the terms of section 103 of the
I.N.A., the Attorney General
is authorized . . .to appoint such employees of the Service as he deems necessary, and to delegate to them or to any officer or employee of the Department
of Justice in his discretion any of the duties and powers imposed upon him in
this chapter ....
Id. § 103(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1970). 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(a) (1976) acknowledges that the
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Bonds37 had exempted the initial deportation hearing from operation
of the Administrative Procedure Act, 3 8 the Giambanco majority
reasoned that to hold the review of such hearings subject to the
A.P.A. provisions would create an "anomalous" situation. 39 The court
therefore held that the procedures governing Board review of dismissals of section 212(h) and 245 claims for relief were outside the ambit
of the Administrative Procedure Act. 40 On the strength of this holding, the same majority, in Cisternas-Estay v. INS, 41 upheld the
42
B.I.A.'s dismissal of the Cisternas-Estays' administrative appeal.
Judge Gibbons dissented in a lengthy opinion that spoke to both
Cisternas-Estay and Giambanco.43 In finding section 5(c) of the
A.P.A. applicable to B.I.A. hearings, he rejected the majority's expansive reading of the holding in Marcello.44 Judge Gibbons believed
that the Supreme Court had severely limited that decision by restricting the I.N.A.'s exemption from the A.P.A. to one specific class of
proceedings while, at the same time, developing a flexible, analytical
framework within which courts could test other types of immigration
hearings. 4 5 The dissent further found that the legislative history of the

authority for the provision of a Board of Immigration Appeals derives from section
103 (a). See 531 F.2d at 152 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
37349 U.S. 302 (1955), discussed at notes 106-123 infra.
391d. at 309-10. The Giambanco court seemed to be relying upon the emphasis
placed in Marcello on "the sole and exclusive procedure" language in section 242(b), 8
U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1970). See 531 F.2d at 144. Marcello, however, did not turn exclusively on this one particular phrase; rather the decision was based on a concatenation of
factors. See 349 U.S. at 310; note 119 infra.
39 531 F.2d at 144.
40 Id. at 144-45.
4' 531 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1976).
42 Id. at 160. The court found that the only distinction between the two cases was
that Giambanco sought an adjustment of status under section 245 and a waiver of a
ground of excludability under section 212(h), while Cisternas-Estay sought a section
243(h) suspension of deportation. This, however, "should not affect the application of
the A.P.A." Id. at 158-59.
43 Giambanco v. INS, 531 F.2d at 149; Cisternas-Estay v. INS, 531 F.2d at 160. (The
identical dissent is reprinted in both cases, and future references will contain only citations to the dissent accompanying the Giambanco decision.)
4531 F.2d at 150.
45Id. at 152. This method of analysis, whose creation Judge Gibbons imputed to the
Marcello decision, see id., consisted of comparing the provisions of I.N.A. § 242(b) with
the analogous sections of the A.P.A. 349 U.S. at 307-08; see 531 F.2d at 152. Upon completion of the comparison, the Marcello Court had determined that
[f]rom the Immigration Act's detailed coverage of the same subject matter
dealt with in the hearing provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, it
is clear that Congress was setting up a specialized administrative procedure
applicable to deportation hearings, drawing liberally on the analogous provi-
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I.N.A. evidenced an explicit congressional intent to subject the entire
range of possible Board adjudications to the A.P.A. standards. 4 6
Overshadowing these considerations were, in the dissent's view, "the
policy and purpose" originally compelling promulgation of the A.P.A.
criteria-reformation of the existing procedural inadequacies in administrative hearings. 4 7 Judge Gibbons concluded that the two cases
should have been reversed and remanded to the Board for a determination of whether "the members . . . had participated or advised

in a 'factually related case' "-the standard mandated by A.P.A. sec-

4
tion 5(c).

8

Viewed historically, federal legislation imposing restrictions on
immigration into this country is of relatively recent origin. Prior to

the passage "of the first general immigration statute in 1882," 4 9 the
attitude of the federal government toward the entry of aliens was one
of beneficence, if not outright encouragement. 50 Individual states,
however, did not share in this viewpoint and several enacted legislation seeking to curb the increasing flow of immigrants into their
borders. 51
The conflict engendered by these policy differences between the
states and the federal government was finally resolved by two Supreme Court cases: Henderson v. Mayor of New York 52 and Chy Lung

v. Freeman.53 These seminal decisions established that the power to
control immigration reposed in the federal government via the commerce clause of the Constitution. 54 Thus, the states were precluded
from infringing upon "the domain of legislation which belongs exclusions of the Administrative Procedure Act and adapting them to the particular
needs of the deportation process.
349 U.S. at 308.
46 531 F.2d at 153-54; see notes 162-65 infra and accompanying text.
47 531 F.2d at 154; see notes 166-72 infra and accompanying text.
48 531 F.2d at 155 (quoting from A.P.A. § 5(c), 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (1970)).
49 1 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 7, § 1.2b. That immigration statute

provided, inter alia, that a head tax of fifty cents be levied upon every passenger who
was not a United States citizen and who came by ship to any port within the jurisdiction
of the United States. Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 376, § 1, 22 Stat. 214.
50 1 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 7, § 1.2a; see IMMIGRATION LAWS

OF THE UNITED STATES § 2 (3d ed. E. Harper 1975) [hereinafter cited as Harper]. This
attitude of beneficence was the dominant theme in United States immigration policy
during the years 1800 through 1875, although there were occasional departures from
this general trend. See I C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra, § 1.2a.
51 See 1 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 7, § 1.2a, at 1-7; Harper, supra
note 50, § 2, at 5.
52 92 U.S. 259 (1875).

53 92 U.S. 275 (1875).
5 Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. at 270, 272-74; Chv Lung v. Freeman,
92 U.S. at 280.
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sively to the Congress of the United States." 55 This affirmation of the
federal government's power marked a climacteric in American policies toward aliens and immigration. From that point forward, federal legislation became increasingly restrictive, 56 reflecting a growing
xenophobia that permeated American attitudes in many areas. 57 An
55 Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. at 272. Henderson and Chy Lung
involved, respectively, New York and California statutes which called for the posting of
a bond indemnifying counties, cities and towns of the state "against any expense for the
relief or support of the person named in the bond for" a specified period of time. Id. at
267; Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. at 276-77. The Henderson Court examined two
earlier authorities, The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. 283 (1849), and New York v. Miln, 36
U.S. 71 (1837), which it felt were not dispositive of the issue of state regulation of
foreign commerce. 92 U.S. at 269. In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court embraced the view that immigration was "a part of our commerce with foreign nations," id.
at 270, and as such was "confided to Congress by the Constitution," id. at 274; accord,
Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. at 280; see Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 591-93
(1884).
Congress' plenary power over immigration has also been found to inhere in
sovereignty and therefore, need not be found in any one of the enumerated powers of
the Constitution. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 711 (1893);
Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892). See also Harisiades v.
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 587 & n.ll (1952); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 534 &
n.18 (1952); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 603-04 (1889).
56 Until 1875, immigration into the United States was virtually unrestricted. See 1 C.
GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 7, § 1.2a; Harper, supra note 50, § 2. Only the
Alien Enemy Act of 1798, ch. 58, § 1, 1 Stat. 570, sought to impose some conditions on
the continued residence of aliens within this country. That Act also "was the first federal legislation dealing with the expulsion of [certain] aliens." Harper, supra, § 2, at 4.
From 1875 to 1921, Congress began to enact qualitative restrictions on immigration.
See generally id. § 3. Reacting to fears expressed by individuals over immigration policy
specifically and anti-alien feelings in general, it passed a series of laws excluding certain specified classes of aliens from entry into the United States. E.g., Act of Feb. 5,
1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874 (repealed 1952) (exclusion of illiterate aliens and creation of a
barred zone whose inhabitants were presumptively declared inadmissible); Act of Feb.
20, 1907, ch. 1134, 34 Stat. 898 (repealed 1917) (exclusion of those with such defects as
might effect their earning ability); Act of Mar. 3, 1903, ch. 1012, § 2, 32 Stat. 1213
(repealed 1917) (exclusion of epileptics, professional beggars and anarchists as well as
those who might become public charges); Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084
(exclusion, inter alia, of polygamists and persons suffering from loathsome diseases);
Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477 (repealed 1974) (prohibiting transportation of
orientals for purpose of cooly labor).
Since 1921, quantitative restrictions have been added to the qualitative controls.
E.g., Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153; Immigration Act of 1921, ch. 8, § 2(a)
42 Stat. 5 (first quota law). The national origins quota system was repealed by Congress
in 1965. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 1, 79 Stat. 911 (effective June 30, 1968)
(amending 8 U.S.C. § 1151 (1964)). The I.N.A. contains more grounds for exclusion and
deportation than any other previous act. Compare Immigration and Nationality Act, 8
U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) with Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat.
874 (repealed 1952) (compilation of prior immigration statutes).
57 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 8-29 (1952), reprinted in [1952]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1653, 1657-80. See also Higham, American Immigration
Policy in Historical Perspective, 21 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 213 (1956). Higham points
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initial indication of this change in attitude came when the contract
labor laws were amended to provide for the exclusion or deportation
of any alien who entered this country in violation of the prohibition
against importing cheap foreign labor. 58 The passage of these laws represented the first time in ninety years that a statute prescribed de59
portation as the method for dealing with unwanted aliens.
The next thirty years witnessed the passage of a sequence of confusing and often unrelated immigration laws 60 whose cumulative effect served only to impede the formulation of an effective national
policy toward aliens. Finally, in response to this confusion, an omnibus deportation bill codifying the prior disparate array of laws affecting immigration was passed. 6 1 This bill, the Immigration Act of
1917, was the first statute to outline, even in a cursory fashion, the
mechanics by which a finding of deportability was to be made. 62 Not
to a complex of social and economic upheavals that led to "[i]mmigration restriction ...
as a simple way of using the power of the state to combat many interlocking social
problems." Id. at 218.
51 Act of Oct. 19, 1888, ch. 1210, 25 Stat. 565 (repealed 1952), amending Act of Feb.
23, 1887, ch. 220, 24 Stat. 414 (deportation provided for aliens who were seeking to land
under contract), amending Act of Feb. 26, 1885, ch. 164, 23 Stat. 332 ("importation
... of... aliens ... into the United States . . . under contract [for the performance of] la-

bor or service of any kind" declared unlawful, with certain enumerated exceptions).
The Supreme Court in Lees v. United States, 150 U.S. 476 (1893), found the original contract labor law and its amendments to be constitutional on the theory that since
"Congress [has] the absolute power to exclude aliens, it may exclude some and admit
others, and the reasons for its discrimination are not open to challenge in the courts."
Id. at 480. The Court went on to state that "the penalty [involved] is visited not upon
the alien laborer . . .but upon the party assisting in the importation," even though the
alien becomes subject to deportation. Id. While the action against the importer was
found to be "civil in form" but "criminal in its nature," id., the Court did not consider
the fact that the amendment made no provision for the manner in which a determination of deportability was to be made. See id. The statute provided simply that when
"the Secretary of the Treasury [was] satisfied that an immigrant ha[d] been allowed to
land contrary to the prohibition of that law," the alien could be deported. Act of Oct. 19,
1888, ch. 1210, 25 Stat. 565 (emphasis added).
59See 1 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 7, § 1.2b, at 1-8. Despite the
absence of a procedure for deportation, much less the existence of procedural protections, this statute "was the direct ancestor of later legislative developments." Id.
60 For a discussion of the proliferation of laws that had been passed between 1888
and 1917, see id. § 1.2b; Harper, supra note 50, §§ 5-8. For an in depth analysis and
history of deportation as practiced in the United States prior to the I.N.A., see J. CLARK,
DEPORTATION OF ALIENS FROM THE UNITED STATES TO EUROPE (1931).
61 Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874 (repealed 1952).
62 Section 17 of the act provided for three-member boards of special inquiry appointed by the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization with the approval of
the Secretary of Labor. This section provided only the most minimal safeguards: "[t]he
immigrant m[ight] have one friend or relative present under . . . regulations . . . pre-

scribed by the Secretary of Labor"; "a complete permanent record" was required to be
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until the Immigration and Nationality Act was there an exhaustive
attempt to describe the grounds for and the means of accomplishing
63
deportation.
In part, the considerations of the I.N.A. were prompted by a
dialectic between Congress and the courts that reflected the tension
between the restrictive policies and purposes of our immigration laws
and the constitutional requirements of due process.6 4 By its enactments, Congress traditionally set the goals of immigration policy with
little concern for the means of accomplishing these ends.6 5 The courts
were therefore forced to establish the perimeters of due process
within which these goals were to be achieved. 6 6 For example, judicial
kept of the proceedings; and appeal to the Secretary of Labor might be made "through
the commissioner of immigration at the port of arrival." Id. Moreover, no provision
was made for assistance of counsel, nor was there express provision for the crossexamination of the government's witnesses nor for presentation of an affirmative case by
the alien. See id. Prior to passage of this act, determinations of deportability had been
left to the unfettered discretion of administrative officers with only the constitutional
remedy of habeas corpus available to provide judicial scrutiny.
63 Compare I.N.A. §§ 241-244, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1254 (1970), with Act of Feb. 5,
1917, ch. 29, § 17, 39 Stat. 874 (repealed 1952).
64 See Comment, Deportation and Exclusion: A Continuing Dialogue Between Congress and the Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 760, 782-89 (1962). The author of the comment
discusses what he feels to be "the dual nature of immigration":
The susceptibility of immigration to a classification blurred between the
"legislative" and the constitutional should not be surprising in view of the
anatomy of the field: it is composed of two basic issues-political control over
the borders, and constitutional due process-each of which, if taken separately,
would lead to opposite conclusions.
Id. at 782 (typeface changed in part).
A more accurate characterization of the problem would be to classify the struggle as
a tension between two competing interests. The demands of immigration policy are not
necessarily antagonistic with the requirements of due process, in the sense of compelling "opposite conclusions." Id. Rather, implementation of this policy without regard to
questions of procedural fairness is the root of the problem.
65 See, e.g., I.N.A. §§ 201-202, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1152 (1970) (numerical limitations
on admission of immigrants and procedures for visa allocation); id. § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182
(1970) (excludable aliens); id. § 236, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (1970) (procedures to determine
excludability); id. § 241, 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1970) (deportable aliens); id. § 242, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252 (1970), (procedures for findings of deportability); Comment, supra note 64, at
783-84. For primary source material regarding expressions of congressional intent, see,
e.g., Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, §§ 3, 11, 15-16, 39 Stat. 874 (repealed 1952); H.R. REP.
No. 1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in [19611 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2950; 104 CONG. REC. 17173-74 (1958); Comment, supra at 784 n.3.
66 See generally Comment, supra note 64. In deciding cases in the immigration area
the Supreme Court has responded to congressional actions which it deemed inappropriate by restrictively interpreting immigration legislation. Congress has likewise sought
to revise judicial actions which it felt were inconsistent with its legislative intent. Giambanco v. INS, 531 F.2d at 145 n.6; id. at 155 (Gibbons, J., dissenting); see Comment,
supra at 781-82 & nn.104-07. The extent of the dialogue may be illustrated by examin-
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construction of the "finality" provisions of the Immigration Act of

1917 had forced the courts to depend solely upon habeas corpus
review, 6 7 thereby setting out the requirements of a fair hearing on a
ing the following examples:
(1) Brownell v. Tom We Shung, 352 U.S. 180 (1956). The Court here held that
section 10 of the A.P.A., which provided for judicial review of a deportation order by
means of an action in a federal district court for a declaratory judgment and injunctive
relief, was available to an alien contesting an order of exclusion. 352 U.S. at 181;
accord, Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 49-52 (1955). This was so despite the
provision in section 242(b) of the I.N.A. making deportation orders of the Attorney General final. In response to these holdings, Congress passed I.N.A. section 106(a)(b) which
provides that the writ of habeas corpus is to be the sole method for review of exclusion
orders. Act of Sept. 26, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-301, § 5a, 75 Stat. 651 (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ l105a(b)(1970)). Additionally, section 106(a)(b) mandated that the standards for review
of immigration litigation were to be based upon the criteria expressed in the Hobbs Administrative Orders Review Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2341-2351 (1970) (formerly codified at 5
U.S.C. §§ 1031-1042 (1964)), rather than those in the Administrative Procedure Act. See
generally H.R. REP. No. 1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 22, reprinted in [1961] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2950, 2960; 107 CONG. REG. 12174-81, 19650-57 (1961) (House and
Senate debates).
(2) Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U.S. 22 (1939), and Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135
(1945). Kessler held that the Act of June 5, 1920, ch. 251, 41 Stat. 1008 (repealed 1952)
(amending Act of Oct. 16, 1918, ch. 186, § 1, 40 Stat. 1012), which provided for the deportation of individuals who were members of or affiliated with the Communist party,
necessarily meant "present membership, or present affiliation.- 307 U.S. at 30 (emphasis by the Court). Passage of the Alien Registration Act of 1940, ch. 439, § 23, 54
Stat. 670 (1940), by Congress reversed this construction by encompassing any association with the Communist party regardless of when it occurred. This, however, was not
the end of the controversy; in Bridges, the Court proceeded to invalidate a deportation
order by drawing narrowly the meaning of the word "affiliation" in the statute. 326 U.S.
at 141-49.
(3) The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86 (1903). This decision mandated that
a hearing be held in accordance with the requisites of due process despite the absence
of any such provision in the Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084. 189 U.S. at
99-102.
(4) Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896). Prior to this decision, the
Chinese Exclusion laws provided that any evasion of its dictates would constitute a
criminal offense, and additionally, that an alien could be imprisoned pending deportation for violating section 4 of that act, without resort to a criminal trial. Act of May 5,
1892, ch. 60, § 4, 27 Stat. 25. In Wong Wing, the Supreme Court held that a trial by jury
was required before a criminal sanction could be imposed even in those instances
where the defendant was an alien. 163 U.S. at 237. This holding served to extend to
aliens the protection afforded by the fifth and sixth amendments in criminal actions.
67 See, e.g., Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 230 (1953); Azzollini v. Watkins, 172
F.2d 897, 898 (2d Cir. 1949); Fafalios v. Doak, 50 F.2d 640, 640 (D.C. Cir. 1931); cf.
Fok Yung Yo v. United States, 185 U.S. 296, 305 (1902) (congressional policy to bar
judicial review of exclusion determinations was manifest); Lem Moon Sing v. United
States, 158 U.S. 538, 549 (1895) (Congress, by providing for administrative finality removed the court's power to review decisions of executive officers in deportation cases);
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713 (1893) (unless expressly authorized
by law, a court could neither reexamine the evidence upon which an alien was found to
be deportable nor weigh its sufficiency); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651,
663 (1892) (Immigration Act of 1891, ch. 551, § 8, 26 Stat. 1085, limited deportation
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piecemeal basis. 68 This process was necessitated by the ill-defined
appeals to the inspector's official superiors and precluded judicial review). With the
passage of the I.N.A., the Court altered its view and found that a deportation order was
reviewable tinder the standards set forth in the A.P.A. See Shaughnessey v. Pedreiro,
349 U.S. 48, 52-53 (1955).
Not until 1961, however, wias there an explicit statutory reference to an alien's right
to judicial review of his deportation order. See I.N.A. § 106, 8 U.S.C. § 1105a (1970)
(making 5 U.S.C. §§ 1031-1042 (1964) (currently codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2341-2351
(1970)) "the sole and exclusive procedure for . . . the judicial review of all final orders
of deportation"). Prior to the passage of section 106 of the I.N.A., the standards for
judicial review of a deportation order evolved slowly on a case-by-case basis through
review of petitions for writs of habeas corpus. This type of writ was utilized since most,
if not all, deportations require some form of detention. It was through testing the legality of preexpulsion detention that the courts were first able to exercise a modicum of
control over the deportation process. The existence of the writ was evident as early as
the case of Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536, 538 (1884), which noted its use
without comment. It was not until Nishimu ra Ekin that use of the writ was formally
endorsed by the Court. See 142 U.S. at 660. The relevant zone of inquiry opened by use
of the writ, however, was severely limited, encompassing only an examination of the
hearing's comportment with procedural due process. Courts were precluded from questioning the weight or sufficiency of the evidence upon which the finding of deportability was made. Id. Gradually, the scope of review available under the writ was expanded
to allow inquiry into three issues: (1) were the findings supported by substantial evidence, 3 K. DAVIS, ADMILNISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 23.08, at 324-25 (1958); see
Lloyd Sabaudo Societa v. Elting, 287 U.S. 329, 335 (1932); cf. Bridges v. Wixon, 326
U.S. 135, 156 (1945) ("evidence . . . too flimsy to support a finding"); (2) were the acts
taken by the immigration officers within the scope of the Attorney General's "statutory
authority," 287 U.S. at 335; see Gegiow v. Uhl, 239 U.S. 3, 9 (1915); and (3) was the
petitioner accorded a hearing "satisf[ying] elementary standards of fairness and reasonableness," 287 U.S. at 335-36; see Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 454, 459 (1920);
Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U.S. 8, 11 (1907); The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189
U.S. 86, 100-01 (1903). See generally Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Colrts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HAlrV. L. REV. 1362, 1388-96
(1953); see also Jaffe, The Right to Judicial Review 1, 71 HARv. L. REV. 401 (1958).
68 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Vajtaner v. Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U.S.
103, 106 (1927) ("[d]eportation . .. on charges unsupported by any evidence is a denial
of due process"); Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 454, 464 (1920) (a decision of an
immigration officer must be based upon evidence incorporated into the record of the
hearing); United States ex rel. Weddeke v. Watkins, 166 F.2d 369, 371 (2d Cir.) ("a
warrant of deportation [must not rest] upon an erroneous ruling of law"), cert. denied,
333 U.S. 876 (1948); Nlaltez v. Nagle, 27 F.2d 835, 837 (9th Cir. 1928) (no ex parte
statements permitted; existence of a right to present and to cross-examine witnesses);
Handlovits v. Adcock, 80 F. Supp. 425, 428 (E.D. Mich. 1948) (right to counsel); Ex
parte Ung King leng, 213 F. 119, 121 (N.D. Cal. 1914) ("[t]he rights of [an alien] may
not be wholly measured by the convenience or inconvenience to the immigration officers in affording . . . a fair hearing").

One case, however, did make an attempt to set forth in detail the precise requirements of a deportation hearing. In Whitfield v. Hanges, 222 F. 745 (8th Cir. 1915),
the court enumerated certain "rules and principles" which it felt would obtain in immigration proceedings: the right to be heard, the right to "be notified of the nature of
the charge against [the alien] in time to meet it," the right to have counsel present, the
right to cross-examine adverse witnesses and to present an affirmative case, and the right
to a letermination based solely upon evidence adduced at the hearing and supported by
"substantial evidence." Id. at 748-49, 751.
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case law and lack of statutory guidelines by which the precise requisites of a fair deportation hearing could be ascertained.
At the same time that this ad hoc procedural evolution was occurring in the immigration area, there was also an intragovernmental
concern that administrative hearings in other contexts required closer
scrutiny as to their conformity with traditional concepts of due
process. 69 From this anxiety arose a series of bills 70 culminating in
the passage of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946. 7 1 The
A.P.A. articulated certain fundamental standards of fairness applicable
to both the adjudicative and legislative functions of administrative
bodies. 72 In order to guard against evasion of these standards, Congress granted the judiciary the power to review administrative
actions. 7 3 No specific exemption from operation of the Act was
granted to any particular agency. 74 The A.P.A., however, contained
two general exclusionary provisions: first, previously existing procedures provided for by statute were left unaffected by the Act; 75 and
second, judicial review would only attach where statutes empowering
76
an agency did not preclude such review.
69 For a detailed discussion of the depth and nature of this concern, see Wong Yang
Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 36-41 & nn.2-21.
70 See id. and sources cited therein.
71 Ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (current version at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-576, 701, 704-706
(1970 & Supp. V 1975); 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 702-703 (West Cum. Supp. 1977)).
72 The legislative, or perhaps more accurately the rule-making, provisions of the
A.P.A. are set forth at 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970); the adjudicative provisions are at id. §§
554, 556-557.
Also contained within the Act is enabling legislation creating the Administrative
Conference of the United States, id. § § 571-576, whose purpose is to create a
mechanism by which private rights before federal agencies "may be fully protected," id.

§ 571.
73 Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, § 10, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (current version at
5 U.S.C. § 701 (1970)).
74 See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1952).
75 Administrative Procedure Act § 7(a), 5 U.S.C. § 556 (1970).
76 Administrative Procedure Act § 10, 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1970). Subsequent to promulgation of the A.P.A., three lower federal appellate courts found that the Act altered the
character of review available to test findings of deportability. See Prince v. Commissioner of Immigration & Naturalization, 185 F.2d 578, 580-81 (6th Cir. 1950); Kristensen
v. McGrath, 179 F.2d 796, 800 (D.C. Cir. 1949), aff'd on other grounds, 340 U.S. 162
(1950); United States ex rel. Trinler v. Carusi, 166 F.2d 457, 460-61, vacated and dismissed as abated, 168 F.2d 1014 (3d Cir. 1948).
In Trinler, the first of these decisions, the court held that "final" in the language of
the Immigration Act of 1917 meant administrative finality and not an absolute preclusion from judicial review. 166 F.2d at 459-60. In addition, the court went on to find that
the 1917 immigration act did not come within any of the exceptions set forth in the
A.P.A. and was therefore subject to its standards. Id. at 461; accord, 185 F.2d at 580-81
(A.P.A. § 10(a)(2) exception for action " 'committed to agency discretion' " did not "bar
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The immediate reaction of the INS was to deny the applicability
of the hearing and review provisions of the A.P.A. to adjudications
conducted under its aegis. 77 Officials of the Service interpreted the
A.P.A. as comprehending within its requirements only those hearings expressly mandated by statute-not those created in response to
judicial decisions and "administrative experience." 78 A conflict developed among the courts as to the validity of this contention, 79 and the
judicial review"); 179 F.2d at 800 (A.P.A. "was not intended to perpetuate preexisting
rigidities in the use of extraordinary legal remedies but rather to simplify and make
more flexible the avenues to judicial relief").
In Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229 (1953), however, the Supreme Court rejected
the expansionist approach followed by the Trinler, Kristensen and Prince courts. The
Supreme Court found instead that finality had a specific history in immigration legislation which indicated "that Congress had intended to make these administrative decisions nonreviewable to the fullest extent possible under the Constitution." Id. at 234.
Additionally, the majority noted that the habeas corpus relief which was available was
of a different character than full judicial review. Id. at 236. The opinion noted in a footnote, however, that this decision was based upon the Immigration Act of 1917 and not
the newly passed 1952 immigration law. Id. at 232 n.4.
Shortly after a split-Court affirmance in Rubenstein v. Brownell, 346 U.S. 929
(1959), aff'g per curiam by an equally divided court 206 F.2d 449 (D.C. Cir. 1953),
where the court of appeals had held that an order of deportation was reviewable under
the A.P.A., 206 F.2d at 403, the Supreme Court decided Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349
U.S. 48 (1955). The Shaughnessy decision reached the issue squarely, holding that the
I.N.A. contained no express exemption as was required by section 12 of the A.P.A. Id.
at 50-51. In light of the broad, remedial purposes of the A.P.A., finality was found to
refer to administrative exhaustion of remedies and not to the precludability of review.
Id. at 51-52; see Brownell v. Tom We Shung, 352 U.S. 180, 184-85 (1956); 345 U.S. at 23840 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
77 Carusi, The Federal Administrative Procedure Act and the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, in THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT AND THE
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 278 (G. Warren ed. 1947).
78 Id. at 296-97.
79 Compare United States ex rel. Lee Wo Shing v. Watkins, 175 F.2d 194, 195 (2d

Cir. 1949) (A.P.A. does not apply) and Azzollini v. Watkins, 172 F.2d 897, 898-99 (2d
Cir. 1949) (often cited as holding A.P.A. does not apply although court failed to reach
issue) and Wolf v. Boyd, 87 F. Supp. 906, 907 (W.D. Wash. 1949) (A.P.A. inapplicable to
deportation proceedings) and Yiakoumis v. Hall, 83 F. Supp. 469, 472 (E.D. Va. 1949)
(A.P.A. does not cover deportation hearings since immigration is an exercise of
sovereign power in international affairs and thus excluded by sections 4 and 5 of the
A.P.A.) and United States ex rel. Lindenau v. Watkins, 73 F. Supp. 216, 219 (S.D.N.Y.
1947) (A.P.A. does not modify existing forms of procedure but changes scope of review),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. United States ex rel. Paetau v. Watkins, 164 F.2d 457
(2d Cir. 1947) with Kristensen v. McGrath, 179 F.2d 796, 800 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (A.P.A.
expands the rights of aliens to judicial review of an order of deportation), aff'd, 340 U.S.
162 (1950) and United States ex rel. Trinler v. Carusi, 166 F.2d 457, 461 (same), vacated
and dismissed as abated, 168 F.2d 1014 (3d Cir. 1948) and United States ex rel. Cammarata v. Miller, 79 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (A.P.A. applies to Board hearings) and
Eisler v. Clark, 77 F. Supp. 610, 611 (D.D.C. 1948) (due process as read into the I.N.A.
demands a hearing in accordance with the A.P.A.'s provisions), cert. denied, 338 U.S.
879 (1949).
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United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 80 to resolve the issue.
Notwithstanding the language of the Act which on its face was
limited to hearings required by statute, the Court, in Wong Yang
Sung v. McGrath, 8 1 held that the A.P.A. did in fact apply to deportation hearings even though they were constitutionally, as opposed to
statutorily, mandated. 8 2 The petitioner in Wong Yang Sung, a citizen
of China serving as a seaman, was arrested when he overstayed his
shore leave in the United States. 83 As a result of a hearing before an
immigration inspector, he was ordered deported and his subsequent
84
appeals to the Acting Commissioner and the B.I.A. were denied.
Upon being taken into custody prior to expulsion, Wong Yang Sung
sought release by instituting habeas corpus proceedings in the district
court for the District of Columbia. 85 The single ground supporting his
petition was "that the administrative hearing was not conducted in
conformity with [sections] 5 and 11 of the Administrative Procedure
Act. "86
80 Wong Yang Sung v. Clark, 338 U.S. 812 (1949), granting cert. to 174 F.2d 158
(D.C. Cir. 1949).
81 339 U.S. 33, modified per curiam, 339 U.S. 908 (1950).
82 339 U.S. at 50. The Court stated
that the limitation to hearings "required by statute" in § 5 of the [A.P.A.] exempts from that section's application only those hearings which administrative
agencies may hold by regulation, rule, custom, or special dispensation; not those
held by compulsion. We do not think the limiting words render the [A.P.A.]
inapplicable to hearings, the requirement for which has been read into a statute
by the Court in order to save the statute from invalidity.
Id.
83 Id. at 35.
84 Id.
85 Id.

86 Id. Wong Yang Sung's specific objection was the fact that the same individuals
were alternately investigators and adjudicators, with colleagues switching roles from
one day to the next. Id. at 45. Also objectionable was the fact that a presiding inspector
may in fact " 'conduct the interrogation of the alien and the witnesses in behalf of the
Government and shall cross-examine the alien's witnesses and present such evidence as
is necessary to support the charges in the warrant of arrest.' " Id. at 46 (quoting from 8
C.F.R. § 150.6(b) (1949)).
Under section 5 of the A.P.A., such commingling of functions would have been
invalid. Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, § 5, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (current version
at 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1970)). Admitting that the commingling of functions here would be
invalid under the Act, the Government argued that the A.P.A. was inapplicable. 339
U.S. at 36. Part of the Immigration Service's theory was based on the failure of the
Immigration Act of 1917 to provide for a hearing, thus exempting it under section 5 of
the A.P.A. which mandated compliance only " '[i]n every case of adjudication required
by statute.' " 339 U.S. at 48 (quoting from Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, § 5, 60
Stat. 237 (1946) (current version at 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1970))). The second aspect of the
Government's theory involved section 7(a) of the A.P.A. which exempted " 'the conduct
of specified classes of proceedings in whole or part by or before boards or other officers
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The salient issue presented to the Court was whether the "general scope" of the A.P.A. covered deportation proceedings. 87 Answering
in the affirmative, the Court traced the etiology of the Act, emphasizing its nature as a piece of remedial legislation designed to correct the
"evils" inherent in existing administrative procedures. 88 Since the Act's
theme was manifestly one of reform, the Court found that the duty
devolved upon the judiciary to effectuate "its remedial purposes
where the evils it was aimed at appear[ed]."89
One such evil, emphasized in the Wong Yang Sung opinion, was

the commingling in a single individual of the incompatible offices of
prosecutor and judge-a practice which occurred in the instant
case. 90 Quoting extensively from a series of investigative committee

reports, the Court discussed the widespread criticism of this
practice. 9 1 Justice Jackson then noted that the deportation hearing in
question was "a perfect exemplification of the practices so unani-

mously condemned."92 Operating from this premise, he went on to
find that "[n]othing in the nature of the parties or proceedings suggest[ed] to the majority that it should absolve "deportation proceedings
from reforms in administrative procedure applicable generally to fed93
eral agencies."
The Court would not ascribe to Congress an intent to grant greater
protections in a hearing created by statute than in one required by
the Constitution. 94 Since immigration hearings were mandated by
specially provided for by . . . statute.' " 339 U.S. at 51 (quoting from Administrative

Procedure Act, ch. 324, § 7, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (current version at 5 U.S.C. § 556(b)
(1970))). The Government further argued that section 16 of the I.N.A. designated immigrant inspectors to conduct deportation hearings and thus the A.P.A. by its terms exempted the hearing. 339 U.S. at 51.
87 339 U.S. at 35.
88 Id. at 36-41.
89 Id. at 41.
901 d. at 45-46. See generally Davis, Separation of Functions in Administrative
Agencies, 61 HARv. L. REV. 389 (1948).
91 339 U.S. at 41-45. For sources criticizing the commingling of functions specifically in the immigration context, see ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES, RECOMMENDATION AND REPORTS 315 (1972) [hereinafter cited as ADMINISTRATIVE

CONFERENCE];

PRESIDENT'S

TION, WHOM SHALL WE WELCOME

COMM'N

ON

IMMIGRATION

AND

NATURALIZA-

158 (1953); Davis, supra note 90, at 389; Maslow,

Recasting Our Deportation Law: Proposalsfor Reform, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 349-59
(1956).
92 339 U.S. at 45.

93 Id. at 46. The opinion emphasized, however, that the A.P.A. did not demand a
complete dichotomy between the investigatory and the prosecutorial functions as exercised by administrative officials. Id. What the Court did not reach was the constitutional
neccesity for procedures patterned after the A.P.A. requirements.
94 Id. at 50.
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constitutional due process rather than by the immigration laws, the
procedures contained within the A.P.A. were found applicable because "[w]hen the Constitution requires a hearing, it requires a fair
one, one before a tribunal which meets at least currently prevailing
standards of impartiality."-95 As was noted in the majority's conclusion, a construction of the 1917 immigration law which would have
eliminated the need for compliance with the A.P.A. would have
96
served to place that statute in "constitutional jeopardy."
95 d. (emphasis added). For a further exposition of the Court's interpretation of
"hearing required by statute," see 25 N.Y.U.L. REv. 638 (1950).
Defining the dimensions of the hearing is the next logical step in the progression
from the premise that the Constitution requires an adjudication. The Wong Yang Sung
Court appears to have developed a new test for determining the adequacy of procedural
safeguards when there is a constitutional imperative to conduct a hearing. The criteria
of the test demand that such hearings be held "before a tribunal which meets at least
currently prevailing standards of impartiality." 339 U.S. at 50. Although not explicitly
outlined in the Court's reasoning, the opinion rejects the contention that the standard
should be grounded upon and limited by the scope of the more lenient due process
clause, since
[it might be difficult to justify as measuring up to constitutional standards of
impartiality a hearing tribunal for deportation proceedings the like of which has
been condemned by Congress as unfair even where less vital matters of property rights are at stake.
Id. at 50-51. But cf. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 49-50 (1975) (person combining
investigative and adjudicative functions presumed unbiased).
In evaluating a particular hearing procedure, the issue to be addressed is not the
quantum of protection offered, but rather how that amount of protection compares to
protections offered similar rights. Since Congress can delineate statutory standards and
the courts can promulgate judicial rules which mandate stricter procedural safeguards
than those set by the Constitution, the judiciary's role is expanded beyond interpretation of the terms of that document. The scope of the Supreme Court's review power is
thus not limited to deciding what constitutes the minimum set forth in the Constitution.
Cf. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943) (the Supreme Court has "the
duty of establishing and maintaining civilized standards of procedure and evidence").
In two decisions handed down shortly after Wong Yang Sung, the Supreme Court
appeared to be exercising its expansive review powers by reversing lower court opinions which refused to extend the A.P.A. to cover hearings conducted by the Interstate
Commerce Commission and postal fraud hearings respectively. See Riss & Co. v. United
States, 341 U.S. 907 (1951), rev'g 96 F. Supp. 452 (W.D. Mo. 1950) and Cates v. Haderlein, 342 U.S. 804 (1951), rev'g 189 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1951). In United States v. L.A.
Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33 (1952), however, the Court refused an opportunity
to state explicitly that Wong Yang Sung was a constitutional decision as opposed to one
of statutory interpretation, see Note, The Requirement of Formal Adjudication Under
Section 5 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 12 HARV. J. LEGIS. 194, 210-11 (1975),
thus leaving the precise rationale behind the holding of that case in some doubt. In
Marcello v. Ahrens, 212 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1954), aff'd sub nom. Marcello v. Bonds, 349
U.S. 302 (1955), the court suggested a possible resolution of the issue: until Congress
develops procedures specifically applicable to a particular administrative adjudication,
the A.P.A. applies; once specific procedures are promulgated, they will supersede the
more general A.P.A. provisions. 212 F.2d at 836.
96 339 U.S. at 50.
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The Wong Yang Sung decision triggered an immediate congressional response. Within six months, the House of Representatives
passed a rider to an appropriations bill which specifically exempted
the Immigration Act of 1917 from the adjudicatory provisions of the
A.P.A. 9 7 Two years later, however, upon passage of the Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952, the rider and its attendant exemption
were repealed. 98 In place of this blanket exemption were substituted
special statutory hearing provisions for matters of deportation and exclusion patterned upon analogous provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act. 99 As regards the commingling of functions, these new
procedures did not extend to the alien the same scope of protection
as that found in the similar A.P.A. provisions. 10 0 Protection of aliens'
97 Act of Sept. 27, 1950, ch. 1052, 64 Stat. 1044. This Act states that "[piroceedings
under law relating to the exclusion or expulsion of aliens shall hereafter be without
regard to the provisions of sections 5, 7, and 8 of the [A.P.A.]." Id. Despite the substantive nature of the Act, as an appropriations bill, the exemption required no approval by
the Senate. As to the constitutionality of the rider, see Sigurdson v. Landon, 215 F.2d
791, 798 (9th Cir. 1954) (argument of unconstitutionality "patently frivolous").
The purpose stated for passage of the rider was to reduce the cost to the INS of
compliance with the A.P.A.'s regulations. See Belizaro v. Zimmerman, 200 F.2d 282, 283
& n.2 (3d Cir. 1952); 96 CONG. REC. 13504-05, 13546-50 (1950). The Wong Yang Sung
Court had decided, however, that procedural fairness was not to depend upon considerations of convenience or expense. 339 U.S. at 40-47, 50. Although this appropriation
revised the result achieved in Wong Yang Sung, it has never been considered as having
destroyed the vitality of that opinion's reasoning. See 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 67,

§ 13.08.
98 Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, § 403(a)(47), 66 Stat. 280 (1952).
id. § 1252(b) (deportation); see Marcello v.
Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 307-10 (1955). The exclusion procedure under section 1226 was
exempted from A.P.A. coverage not on the basis of its "mirror provisions," but because
the Court has long held that in exclusion cases the procedure provided by Congress is
presumed to be due process of law. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345
U.S. 206, 212 (1953); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544
(1950); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 666 (1892).
ioo Compare 8 U.S.C. 1252(b) (1970) (special inquiry officer may still in certain circumstances assume the disparate roles of investigator, advocate and judge, although he
is prevented from conducting deportation hearings in which he had participated in the
investigation) with 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (1970) ("[ain employee or agent engaged in the
performance of investigative or prosecuting functions for an agency in a case may not, in
that or a factually related case, participate or advise in the decision, recommended
decision, or agency review" (emphasis added)) and id. § 554(d)(2) (the special inquiry
officer should not "be responsible to or subject to the supervision or direction of" those
in the agency who are also responsible for "investigative or prosecuting functions").
Although the Attorney General has moved in a limited number of cases to provide
for a separation of functions, 8 C.F.R. § 24 2 .16(c) (1976), the provision is merely a rule
instituted at his discretion and not a statutory mandate. In addition, the majority of
immigration cases involve some form of discretionary relief in which there is no separation requirement. A study conducted for the Administrative Conference of the United
States has indicated that "[i]t seems likely, on the basis of our interviews and extensive
file examination, that the multiple functions of examiners do affect the outcome of some
99 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (1970) (exclusion);

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8: 250

rights was not, however, the basis for passage of these sections;
rather, they were specifically tailored to meet the particular administrative requirements of the Service.' 01 In an apparent contradiction,
the 1952 immigration act, although delineating this new methodology
for determining deportability, 10 2 did not contain, as was required by
section 559 of the A.P.A., l0 3 a specific exemption from that act. 10
What it did provide was that "[t]he procedure [described in the
I.N.A.] shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for determining the
deportability of an alien under this section."' 0 5 The question then
arose as to whether these new hearing provisions, when read in light
of the "sole and exclusive procedure" language, were sufficient to excuse deportation hearings from the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act.
In Marcello v. Bonds, the Supreme Court directly addressed this
issue and decided that mirror provisions, when coupled with lan06
guage of exclusivity, were sufficient to create such an exemption.'
The petitioner in Marcello was a native of Africa who had been brought
10 7
to the United States as an infant and had continued to reside here.
In 1938, he was convicted of violating the Marihuana Tax Act' 0 8
and "sentenced to imprisonment for one year."' 10 9 At a hearing in

section 245 adjudications." ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE,

sUpra note 91, at 316. See

also Maslow, supra note 91, at 350-53.
101 98 CONG. REC. 5626 (1952). Senator McCarran, cosponsor of the bill, remarked
that
the Department pointed out that in the majority of deportation cases . . . the
dual-examiner system would hamper effective administration without any compensating advantage.
*

. .

[I]t has been demonstrated that it would be impracticable to adapt the

dual-examiner system to the deportation procedures ....

. . . This bill eliminates [the] exemption [provided by the Appropriations
Rider] but accomplishes such elimination with due regard for the administrative
problems of the [INS] by providing at the same time the special procedures

which these problems require.
Id.
102

See I.N.A. § 242(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1970).

103 5 U.S.C. § 559 (1970). This section provides that a "[s]ubsequent statute may not

be held to supersede or modify this subchapter . . . except to the extent that it does so
expressly." Id.
104

See generally NIarcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955), discussed at notes 37-38

supra & 106-23 infra and accompanying text.
105 I.N.A. § 242(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1970).

349 U.S. at 308-10.
Id. at 311 n.5.
108 Act of Aug. 2, 1937, ch. 553, 50 Stat. 551 (repealed 1939).
109 349 U.S. at 303. Section 241(a)(11) of the I.N.A., 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(11) (1970),
106
107
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1953 held pursuant to section 242(b) of the I.N.A., Marcello chose
not to controvert the fact of his earlier conviction, but challenged the
nature of the present deportation "proceedings on the ground that
they violated due process and the Administrative Procedure Act
... "110 He specifically objected to the Service's use of a "special inquiry officer [who] was under the supervision and control of officials
in the Immigration Service [and] who performed investigative and
prosecuting functions.""' Both the hearing officer and the B.I.A. had
dismissed this contention in a cursory fashion, drawing support for

their actions from the legislative history of the A.P.A.

112

On appeal, the petitioner directed the Supreme Court's attention

to differences in the scope of the protections afforded by the I.N.A.
and the Administrative Procedure Act.113 He urged that wherever a
"variance" between the acts exists, the more comprehensive A.P.A.

standards should "govern unless those of the Immigration Act 'shall
.. .expressly' negate their application. "114 In rejecting this approach,

makes the conviction of any offense relating to the use, possession or sale of narcotics
(including marihuana) a deportable offense. Section 241(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(d) (1970),
provides further that such deportation provisions shall be applied even though the con5 I. & N. Dec. 261,
viction occurred prior to the enactment of the 1952 Act. See M_,
263 (B.I.A.), afJfd sub nom. United States ex rel. Marcello v. Ahrens, 113 F. Supp. 22
(E.D. La. 1953), aff d, 212 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1954), aff d sub nora. Marcello v. Bonds,
349 U.S. 302 (1955).
110 349 U.S. at 303 (citation omitted). Without citation to any authority, the Court
dismissed the due process theory of petitioner, saying that
[t]he contention is without substance when considered against the longstanding practice in deportation proceedings, judicially approved in numerous
decisions il the federal courts, and against the special considerations applicable
to deportation which the Congress may take into account in exercising its particularly broad discretion in immigration matters.
Id. at 311.
11 Id. at 304.
112 Id. at 303-04. The B.I.A. had cited to the joint conference report which stated
that
"the conferees are satisfied that procedures provided in the bill, adapted to the
necessities of national security and the protection of economic and social welfare of the citizens of this country, remain within the framework and the pattern
of the Administrative Procedure Act."
M_
5 1. & N. Dec. 261, 263 (B.I.A.) (quoting from [1952] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWs 1653, 1754), aff'd sub norn. United States ex rel. Marcello v. Ahrens, 113 F.
Supp. 22 (E.D. La. 1953), aff'd, 212 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1954), aff'd sub nora. Marcello v.
Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955).
113 349 U.S. at 305.
114Id. (quoting from Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, § 12, 60 Stat. 237 (1946)
(current version at 5 U.S.C. § 559 (1970))). The discrepancy emphasized by Marcello in
prosecuting his appeal arose from a comparison of "the 'separation of functions' provision of § 5(c) of the [A.P.A.]" with section 242(b) of the I.N.A. 349 U.S. at 305.
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the Marcello Court premised its holding on the cumulative effect of
three findings. 1 15 First, a functional analysis of the respective statutory provisions revealed that a conscious attempt had been made to
cover within the I.N.A. "the same subject matter dealt with in the
hearing provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act . . .adapting
them to the particular needs of the deportation process." 116 Second,
not only did the legislative history of the I.N.A. expressly acknowledge the "adoptive technique," but it also recognized that "particular
deviations" in coverage did exist. 1 17 Finally, the presence of deviations was coupled with the manifest directive of the statute that the
I.N.A. procedure was to constitute the " 'sole and exclusive' " method
of conducting deportation proceedings. 11 8 The Court acknowledged
that while no literal exemption from the applicability of the A.P.A.
existed in the language of either act, Congress did not need "to employ magical passwords in order to" exempt the I.N.A. hearing provisions from the A.P.A. standards.119
See 349 U.S. at 310.
116 Id. at 307-09.
117 Id.
at 310. The remarks of Senator McCarran in opposition to a proposed
amendment to his bill are most illuminating in this regard, for he stated that
the committee bill goes further [than the amendment] by writing within the
framework of the Administrative Procedure Act specific procedures which are
specially adopted to the exclusion and expulsion of aliens.
115

•. . Except for the failure to comply strictly with the dual-examiner provisions of the [A.P.A.], I believe that the procedures set forth are in substantial
compliance with the procedural rationale of the [A.P.A.]. I further believe that
it has been demonstrated that it would be impracticable to adapt the dualexaminer system to the deportation procedures ....
98 CONG. REC. 5625-26 (1952) (emphasis added). See also, e.g., S. REP. No. 1137, 82d
Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1952); H.R. REP. No. 1365, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 58 (1952) reprinted
in [1952] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1653, 1713; 98 CONG. REc. 4414-16, 5417-21,
5433-34, 5604, 5618-19, 5778-88 (1952).
118 349 U.S. at 309 (quoting from I.N.A. § 242(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1970)).
119 349 U.S. at 310. The Court did not rest its determination on any single factor;
rather, the opinion reflected a concatenation of elements: the legislative history, congressional recognition of departures from the A.P.A. requirements, and "the sole and
exclusive procedure" language of the statute. Id. While acknowledging that "[e]xemptions from the terms of the Administrative Procedure Act are not lightly to be presumed," the Court stated that one could not overlook "the background of the" immigration act and "its laborious adaption of the Administrative Procedure Act" procedures. Id.
The most disturbing aspect of the opinion, however, was the short shrift given to
the Court's earlier holding in Wong Yang Sung. See 349 U.S. at 306-07. Immediately
upon repeal of the Appropriations Rider, one of the A.P.A.'s sponsors had indicated that
the decision should have been reinstated to its full force and effect. 98 CONG. REC. 4416
(1952). Yet, the majority in Marcello chose to ignore its constitutional, as opposed to
purely statutory, imperative. See 349 U.S. at 306-07.
The Marcello Court also failed to analyze the congressionally instituted mirror pro-
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Despite the expansive language in Marcello that the I.N.A.
"expressly supersedes the hearing provisions of" the A.P.A., 120 that
holding must be viewed within the context of the question presented
to the Court and the analysis upon which the opinion was predicated.
At no point in its discussion of the case did the Court address itself to
the existence of any possible interfaces between the A.P.A. and other
immigration proceedings except for the limited question of deportation hearings conducted under section 242(b) of the I.N.A. of 1952.
The issue as framed by the Marcello Court was limited to the failure
of section 242(b) to comply with the A.P.A. standards for the conduct
of administrative hearings. 12 1 Furthermore, in erecting the analytical
framework within which it studied the relationship between the two
acts, the Supreme Court focused only on the particular procedures
provided for in the deportation process, and not on any other of the
possible immigration proceedings.' 2 2 Thus, the Court did not address
the issue of A.P.A. applicability to hearings before the Board of Im23
migration Appeals. 1
This failure to analyze the impact of the A.P.A. upon adjudications beyond deportation hearings was not evident until the problem
was faced by the Third Circuit in Giambanco and Cisternas-Estay.
The types of relief sought by the petitioners in those cases encompassed classes of immigration actions distinct from that exempted
from the A.P.A. by the Marcello Court. 1 2 4 Further confounding the
court's task was the fact that the adjudicatory body which Giambanco
and Cisternas-Estay sought to have governed by the A.P.A. standards
was not expressly provided for by the I.N.A. 12 5 Speaking through
cedures in light of the analysis in Wong Yang Sung that
[w]hen the Constitution requires a hearing, it requires a fair one, one before a
tribunal which meets at least currently prevailing standards of impartiality. A
deportation hearing involves issues basic to human liberty and happiness and
• . . perhaps to life itself. It might be difficult to justify as measuring up to
constitutional standards of impartiality a hearing tribunal for deportation proceedings the like of which has been condemned by Congress as unfair even
where less vital matters of property rights are at stake.
339 U.S. at 50-51; see 349 U.S. at 315-18 (Black, J., dissenting).
120 349 U.S. at 310.
121 Id. at 304-09.
122 Giambanco v. INS, 531 F.2d at 152; see 349 U.S. at 305-10.
123 See 349 U.S. at 307-08.
12A See 531 F.2d at 143, 156. Giambanco was seeking an adjustment of his status as a
nonimmigrant under section 245 of the I.N.A., 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1970), and a waiver of a
ground of excludability under section 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (1970). 531 F.2d at 143.
Cisternas-Estay had petitioned for suspension of deportation under section 243(h), 8

U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1970).
125

531 F.2d at 152 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). The Senate rejected several attempts
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Judge Biggs, the majority in Gianbanco adopted a broad reading of
the Marcello holding, finding that "it would be anomalous to
[exempt] the initial immigration hearing" from the A.P.A. while concurrently mandating that Board "review of such [a] hearing was not
[also] exempt."' 12 6 To conclude otherwise, in the court's view, would
serve only to "interject needless complexity into what [was] designed
to be a discretionary process"; 127 it would also necessitate compliance
with "different standards for [the] separation of adjudicative and prosecutorial functions" at the hearing and review stages of immigration
28
hearings. 1
Aside from the desire to avoid the twin problems of "needless
complexity" and "different standards" at the two levels "for [the] separation of

.

..

functions," the court found the holding to be "com-

'
Under this provision
pelled by the language of section 242 itself. "129
of the Immigration Act, the Attorney General has been delegated, inter alia, the responsibility to "assure by regulation" that all deporta-

to provide for a statutory B.I.A., ostensibly on the ground that an independent board
within a department should not be able to overturn the decisions of the department
head. See id. See also 98 CONG. REC. 4401, 4415, 4431, 5608, 5612-13, 5618-19 (1952).
126531 F.2d at 144. The quoted passage highlights an important conceptual error
committed by the majority. Throughout the Gianbanco opinion, Judge Biggs does not
attempt to delineate the distinctions betwepn section 242(b) adjudications and discretionary adjustment under other applicable I.N.A. provisions of those section 242 determinations. The court speaks in overly broad terms of "initial immigration hearing[s]"
and an exemption under Marcello for "the hearing procedures of the immigration
judge." Id. The majority also discusses initial immigration hearings as "be[ing] a discretionary process." Id. From the context of the discussion presented by the court, it is
possible to define initial immigration hearings as section 242(b) deportation adjudications. Id. at 143-45. If so, the court is clearly in error in describing them as "discretionary." Id. at 144. There is no language in section 242(b) setting forth the requirements for
immigration hearings which is capable of being interpreted as indicating that such adjudications are discretionary. Additionally, the Supreme Court has been consistent in
mandating a trial-type adjudication for deportations. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339
U.S. at 49-50; Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 454, 459, 464 (1920); The Japanese
Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1903). Furthermore, the determination that an
individual is deportable does not require the exercise of discretion; either the alien
fulfills the statutory requisites for deportability or he does not.
127531 F.2d at 144.
128Id.

129 Id. For a comparison of the differing standards for review set by A.P.A. § 554
and I.N.A. § 242(b), see note 100 supra.
In a footnote in its discussion at this point, the court advanced the thesis that since
the immigration hearing is exempt from compliance with the A.P.A. under the Marcello
rationale, "it presumably would be subject to the more lenient due process standard."
531 F.2d at 144 n.3. It is unclear why the traditional due process test should be used to
examine the hearing procedures under the I.N.A. when Congress has provided more
stringent provisions against commingling of functions in section 242(b).
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tion adjudications are held in conformity with the "mirror" hearing
procedures delineated by Congress in subsections (b)(1) through (b)(4)
of section 242.130 It is further stipulated in this section that in all cases
where an alien is ordered to be deported, the Attorney General's
131
decision shall be considered "final.'
As a means of effectively discharging this statutory duty to oversee orders of deportation, the Attorney General has exercised his discretion by establishing the Board of Immigration Appeals.' 32 Acting
as his "surrogate" in immigration matters, the Board was perceived
by the court to constitute a mechanism by which the rights and
130 531 F.2d at 144. See I.N.A. § 242(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1970), which states the
following:
Proceedings before a special inquiry officer acting under the provisions of this
section shall be in accordance with such regulations, not inconsistent with this
Act, as the Attorney General shall prescribe. Such regulations shall include requirements that(1) the alien shall be given notice, reasonable tinder all the circumstances,
of the nature of the charges against him and of the time and place at which the
proceedings will be held;
(2) the alien shall have the privilege of being represented (at no expense to
the Government) by such counsel, authorized to practice in such proceedings,
as he shall choose;
(3) the alien shall have a reasonable opportunity to examine the evidence
against him, to present evidence in his own behalf, and to cross-examine witnesses presented by the Government; and
(4) no decision of deportability shall be valid unless it is based upon
reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence.
In Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 281-82 (1966), the Supreme Court found that the
statute did not set forth a standard for deportation orders, but rather provided a standard
for judicial review. The Court held that the standard for a deportation order was "clear,
unequivocal, and convincing evidence." Id. at 286.
131 I.N.A. § 242(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1970); see Giambanco v. INS, 531 F.2d at 144.
For a discussion of the meaning of "final" under section 242(b), see note 76 supra.
132 Giambanco v. INS, 531 F.2d at 144. The majority opinion does not point to any
specific section of the immigration act as directly authorizing creation of the Board. Id.
Instead, it examines the responsibilities of the Attorney General and concludes that
"[t]he Board has been established at the Attorney General's discretion to implement the
statutory requirements of deportation and exclusion under the INA." Id.; see note 130
supra. By focusing implicitly on section 242(b) as the source of the Attorney General's
power, the court was able to assert that discretionary relief from deportation is "an
integral part of the exempt section 242 procedure." Giambanco v. INS, 531 F.2d at 144.
Under I.N.A. § 103(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1970), the Attorney General is empowered "to delegate .. .in his discretion any of the duties and powers imposed upon him
in this chapter." See Giambanco v. INS, 531 F.2d at 152 (Gibbons, J., dissenting);
Noverola-Bolaina v. INS, 395 F.2d 131, 133 (9th Cir. 1968); 8 C.F.R. pt. 3, at 7 (authority
note) (1976). Sitting in review of an immigration officer's exercise of discretion, the
Board acts as part of an all-inclusive appellate procedure and not merely as an extension
of a section 242 proceeding. Such an expansion in the scope of the practice tinder section 242(b) has the effect of making its "mirror provisions" control the procedure under
other sections of the I.N.A., contrary to the intent of Congress. See notes 175-76 infra.
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privileges of aliens caught up in the deportation process were to be
protected.' 33 Judge Biggs noted that, as such a prophylactic device,
"[t]he Board has been made by the Attorney General a central part of
his implementation of section 242."134 Thus, in accordance with the
Supreme Court's holding in Marceilo, appellate hearings conducted
by the B.I.A. were considered to be within the ambit of section 242's
"sole and exclusive procedure" language and therefore exempted
from the dictates of the Administrative Procedure Act. 13 5 Although
the court recognized that a section 242 determination of deportation
was not at issue in either Giambanco or Cisternas-Estay, it still found
the A.P.A. to be inapplicable to the hearings involved. It was noted
that whenever the Board is petitioned to grant an adjustment of
status, 136 "to waive a ground of excludability,' 3 7 or to suspend an
order of deportation,' 38 "it is acting as an integral part of the exempt
242 procedure."' 139 Such a conclusion was deemed to flow from the
consideration that, since these adjudications relate ultimately to the
propriety of a finding of deportability, they cannot be viewed as dis40
tinct processes. 1
Examining the legislative history of the I.N.A., the majority
found additional support for its contention that the B.I.A. was not
subject to the Administrative Procedure Act. Rather than focusing on
some affirmative act, the court noted the absence of any indication
that Congress did not intend the Board "to operate in conjunction
with the exempt specialized hearing procedures of section 242."141 In
the majority's view, a finding that the Board was subject to the A.P.A.
would require "hypothesiz[ing] a disjointed congressional intent that
makes no appearance in the legislative history of the 1952 Act."142
This, however, was not the only Congressional inaction which the
133 Giambanco v. INS, 531 F.2d at 144.
134 Id.
135

Id.

136 I.N.A. § 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1970).
137Id. § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (1970).
138 Id. § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1970).
139 Giambanco v. INS, 531 F.2d at 144; Cisternas-Estay v. INS, 531 F.2d at 159.
140 Cisternas-Estay v. INS, 531 F.2d at 159; see note 157 infra.
141 Giambanco v. INS, 531 F.2d at 144.
142 Id. at 145. For a discussion of the "disjointed intent" of Congress, see notes
174-77, 185-89 infra and accompanying text. In a footnote, the court indicated that section 7 of the A.P.A. exempted proceedings before boards "specially provided for" by
statute. The Giambanco court held "that Board review under the INA is an extension of
the proceeding specially provided for under INA section 242; therefore, in [its] view,
the exemption should apply." 531 F.2d at 145 n.6. For a criticism of this view, see note
126 supra.
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court found to be significant. When the A.P.A. was amended and recodified in 1966,143 Congress had both the opportunity and the power to restructure the Act in order to eliminate the exemption provided
for the I.N.A. by the holding in Marcello. Noting that Congress had
failed at that time to take any remedial action, the court indicated that
this was an expression of implicit agreement with the Marcello result,
since "Congress ha[d] been quick to act in the past when it disagree[d] with the Court's application of the APA in the immigration
area. "144

Speaking in dissent, Judge Gibbons assailed the majority position
on three grounds. First, the court's opinion extended the scope of the
holding in Marcello by ignoring the reasoning upon which that decision was based. Second, there was an express indication in the legislative history of the I.N.A. of congressional intent to bring the Board
within the ambit of the Administrative Procedure Act. Third, and
most importantly, strong policy considerations compelled a contrary
result. 145
Judge Gibbons noted that in extending the scope of A.P.A. exemptions to include appellate review by the B.I.A., the majority failed
to take cognizance of the basic premise underlying Marcello:146 subsequent statutes cannot supersede the provisions of the A.P.A. absent
a clear intent to do so. 1 47 He pointed out that section 12 of the A.P.A.
143 Act of Sept. 6, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 378 (current version at 5 U.S.C
500-576, 701, 704-706 (1970 & Supp. V 1975); 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 702-703 (West Cum.
Supp. 1977)).
144 Giambanco v. INS, 531 F.2d at 145 n.6.
14S Id. at 150 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
146 See id. at 150, 152.
147 Administrative Procedure Act § 12, 5 U.S.C. 559 (1970); Giambanco v. INS, 531
F.2d at 152. In the case of Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367, 375-80 (1962), the Court addressed
the question of whether the procedures mandated by I.N.A. § 360(b)-(c) superseded the
provisions of the A.P.A. The appellee, Cort, was an American-born physician who had
moved to Czechoslovakia ostensibly to avoid the draft. When his passport expired he
applied for a new one, but it was denied pursuant to section 349(a)(10) of the I.N.A.,
which provided that an individual could lose his citizenship if he remained outside the
United States to avoid military service. Id. at 368-70. Cort then instituted an action in
federal court to declare this section unconstitutional. Id. at 369. Relying upon the
amended version of the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1958) (current
version at 28 U.S.C.A. § 2201 (West Cum. Supp. 1977)), in conjunction with the A.P.A.,
the three-judge court rejected the Secretary of State's contention that I.N.A. § 360(b)-(c)
was the sole method of proceeding available to Cort, and additionally found section
349(a)(10) to be unconstitutional. Cort v. Herter, 187 F. Supp. 683 (D.D.C. 1960), aff'd
in part, 369 U.S. 367 (1962).
Upon direct appeal, the Supreme Court reached only the question of jurisdiction.
369 U.S. at 370. In making its determination, the Court examined the genesis of section
349(a)(10) and found that the legislative history reflected an intent to reduce the abuse
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provides that deviations from its terms must be express.

148

It was clear

to the dissent that the Marcello Court, by its holding, had interpreted
this section to include statutes whose legislative history indicates a
congressional intent to carve out an exemption through creation of
mirror provisions, as opposed to those containing literal statements
of exemption. 1 4 9 Building upon this assumption, the dissent determined that the Marcello Court had proceeded to articulate a process
for determining the applicability of the A.P.A. hearing in a variety
of contexts. 150
Judge Gibbons reasoned that this development of "a method of
analysis to employ in discovering the interrelationship between" the
A.P.A. and the I.N.A. was the most significant aspect of the holding
in Marcello.151 The Marcello Court had not, therefore, in his opinion,
formulated a general rule of exemption to be mechanically applied as
the Giambanco majority was doing. 152 According to Judge Gibbons,
by certain classes of individuals of an earlier I.N.A. provision. Id. at 375-79. Since Cort
was not a member of the class against whom the section was directed, the Court held
that Congress did not intend to preclude him from prosecuting a suit for declaratory and
injunctive relief. Id. at 379. Prior decisional law indicates "that the Court will not hold
that the broadly remedial provisions of the Administrative Procedural Act are unavailable to review administrative decisions under the 1952 Act in the absence of clear and
convincing evidence that Congress so intended." Id. at 379-80.
Additional cases, while not articulating the nature of the relationship between the
A.P.A. and the I.N.A. have nonetheless proceeded to apply A.P.A. standards in reviewing administrative action. Giambanco v. INS, 531 F.2d at 144 n.1; see, e.g., Noel v.
Chapman, 508 F.2d 1023, 1029-31 (2d Cir. 1975) (INS exercise of its rulemaking authority must conform to the A.P.A.); Blackwell College of Business v. Attorney General, 454
F.2d 928, 930, 933-35 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (license revocation by the INS under I.N.A.
§ 101(a)(15), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) (1970), must conform to the A.P.A. since there is no
administrative procedure set forth in the statute); Wong Wing Hang v. INS, 360 F.2d
715, 717 (2d Cir. 1966) (review procedures of A.P.A. § 10, 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1964), apply
to review of abuse of discretion under I.N.A. § 106, 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (1970)); Xytex
Corp. v. Schliemann, 382 F. Supp. 50, 52 (D. Colo. 1974) (limited judicial review under
A.P.A. § 10(e), 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970), applicable to certification under I.N.A.
§ 212(a)(14), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14) (1970)); Hou Ching Chow v. Attorney General, 362
F. Supp. 1288, 1292 (D.D.C. 1973) (revocation of rule granting exemption to I.N.A.
§ 212(a)(14), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14) (1970), must proceed in conformance with A.P.A. §
4, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970)).
The Seventh Circuit in United States v. Martin, 467 F.2d 1366 (7th Cir. 1972), has
indicated that "it is clear that administrative hearings in deportation cases must conform
to due process of law and the Administrative Procedure Act." Id. at 1368. This decision,
however, appears to be an aberration since the coirt fails to discuss the clear holding to
the contrary in Marcello and cites only Wong Yang Sung for support. See id.
148 Giambanco v. INS, 531 F.2d at 152 (relying upon 5 U.S.C. § 559 (1970)).
149 See Giambanco v. INS, 531 F.2d at 152 (relying upon 349 U.S. at 310).
150 Giambanco v. INS, 531 F.2d at 152.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 152, 154.
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"[a] court must compare" the provisions of both acts to discover whether "Congress meant to adopt the procedural safeguards of the A.P.A.
to the particular needs of the I.N.S."'1 53 He concluded that if the reviewing court finds that Congress has provided for either a specific
exemption of an act from the A.P.A. or has adopted "mirror provisions," it should not then subject that act to the A.P.A.'s hearing
54
requirements. 1
Applying this analytical framework to the facts in the instant
case, the dissent first looked to the I.N.A. to discover whether the
Board had been mentioned within the language of the Act. Since
Congress had expressly refrained from a legislative adoption of the
B.I.A., Judge Gibbons hypothesized that it could not have intended
the hearing provisions it did enact-the I.N.A. section 242(b) mirror
provisions-to apply to the Board. 155 Furthermore, in examining the
153 Id.
It is problematical whether Judge Gibbons' view that the Marcello Court was
consciously developing a mandatory procedure by which to test the A.P.A.'s applicability to the I.N.A. was correct. Justice Clark in Marcello had viewed a comparative
analysis of the two acts as but one method of determining whether Congress, with its
passage of the immigration act, intended to restore the doctrine expressed in Wong
Yang Sung. 349 U.S. 306-07.
In Wong Wing Hang v. INS, 360 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1966), the court attempted to
review the denial of an application for a suspension of deportation under I.N.A.
§ 244(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1964). 360 F.2d at 716. Finding that section 106 of that
act did not provide a suitable standard to be applied in such a case, the court
turn[ed] for illumination to § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, a course
particularly appropriate in light of the expressed congressional purpose to fashion in § 106 a statutory procedure of review that "implements and applies" § 10
of the APA.
Id. at 717 (quoting from H.R. REP. No. 1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 22, reprinted in [1961]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2950, 2966).
The significance of this reasoning is twofold. First, the court appeared implicitly to
adlopt the methodology of the Marcello Court by examining the statutory scheme of
section 106 to determine if mirror provisions had been developed. Second, the decision
referred to the legislative history of the Act in order to determine the congressional
intent. 360 F.2d at 717. The House Report indicates a
purpose . . . to create a single, separate, statutory form of judicial review of
administrative orders for the deportation and exclusion of aliens from the
United States, by adding a new section 106 to the Immigration and Nationality
Act. In so doing, the bill implements and applies section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 1009).
H.R. REP. No. 1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 22, reprinted in [1961] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWs 2950, 2966. Prior to passage of section 106, the Supreme Court had determined
that the A.P.A. provided the means for reviewing I.N.A. adjudications. See Shaughnessy
v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 50-51 (1955); note 76 supra. Thus, what the Wong Wing Hang
court, in interpreting section 106, and the House, in passing it, were implementing was
the statutory dictate of the A.P.A. that deviations from its terms must be express. See
Giambanco v. INS, 531 F.2d at 152 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
154 Giambanco v. INS, 531 F.2d at 152.
155 See id. at 153-54. There are clear indications of a contrary intent in the House
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scope of the Board's appellate jurisdiction, Judge Gibbons concluded
that its hearings are not mere extensions of adjudications under section 242;156 rather, they are "distinct proceeding[s] in need of some
procedural safeguards.' 1 5 7 It was noted that the administrative regulations creating and guiding the B.I.A.'s procedure, however, do not
even contain an equivalent to the abbreviated protections regarding
disqualification of inquiry officers afforded aliens in their initial hearings under section 242(b) of the I.N.A. 158 Hence, in the dissent's
Report accompanying the I.N.A.'s passage. In the course of an analysis of the bill's
provisions, the report states that
[i]t is believed that the Board has well served its purpose and has greatly contributed to a fair and equitable administration of justice in immigration, nationality, and naturalization cases. Refraining at this time from proposing to
change the status of the Board into a statutory body, the committee is of the
opinion that the Attorney General should not alter in any way the structure
and functions of the Board.
H.R.REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 35-36 (emphasis added), reprinted in [1952] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1653, 1687-88. During debate over passage of the immigration act, at least two proposals were made for creation of a statutory Board. 98 CONG.
REC. 4401, 5603-04, 5608, 5611-13, 5618-19, 5778 (1952). Arguments advanced for
its passage included the considerations that the Board's existence was "tenuous" and
contingent, and that it was dependent, not upon "authorization of law," but rather upon
"administrative regulation." Id. at 4401. Additional arguments raised in the Senate
centered around the propriety of reposing in the Attorney General "dictatorial power, without appeal, over the lives of others." Id. at 5778. The argument most often advanced in
opposition to the creation of a statutory Board was that it would establish an independent body within the Department of Justice capable of reversing decisions made by the
Attorney General. Giambanco v. INS, 531 F.2d at 153 (Gibbons, J., dissenting); 98
CONG. REC. 5780 (1952). Yet another argument against such a Board was raised by
Senator McCarran who felt that his proposed administrative court would obviate the
need for establishment of a Board by statute. Id. at 5778. In any event, no such proposal
for a statutory Board was passed by the conference committee. See Giambanco v. INS,
531 F.2d at 153 (Gibbons, J., dissenting); S. REP. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 8
(minority report on S.2550); H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 36, reprinted in
[1952] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1653, 1687-88.
156 See Giambanco v. INS, 531 F.2d at 152-53.
157 Id. at 153. Under 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(d)(1) (1976), the B.I.A. has been vested with the
"discretion and authority conferred upon the Attorney General by law" in matters of
deportation and exclusion. Courts have interpreted this discretion as not limiting the
B.I.A. to reviewing findings of fact made by the hearing examiner. Instead it may review the record de novo and may make factual determinations inconsistent with those
of the special inquiry officer. Giambanco v. INS, 531 F.2d at 153 (Gibbons, J., dissenting); see United States ex rel. Barbour v. District Director, 491 F.2d 573, 578 (5th Cir.
1974); Carrasco-Favela v. INS, 445 F.2d 865, 866 (9th Cir. 1971); Noverola-Bolaina v.
INS, 395 F.2d 131, 135-36 (9th Cir. 1968); Goon Wing Wah v. INS, 386 F.2d 292,
293-94 (1st Cir. 1967); De Lucia v. INS, 370 F.2d 305, 308 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S.
912 (1967).
158
See Giambanco v. INS, 531 F.2d at 153; 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.1-.8 (1976). This part of
the regulation fails to delineate any standards for voluntary or mandatory disqualification of Board members. In contrast, section 242(b) of the I.N.A. provides that "[n]o
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view, if the Giambanco holding is generally accepted, the alien at his
Board hearing will be afforded only the minimal safeguards provided
by due process, while at the initial hearing the stricter statutory protections will be available. 15 9 Judge Gibbons believed that denial of
A.P.A. applicability to Board hearings thus results in a different
"anomalous" situation: placing a litigant before an appellate body
clothed with fewer procedural protections than were afforded him
at his initial adjudication. 160 He noted that this anomaly is surely
much greater than that inherent in a finding that Congress did have a
disjointed intent in exempting the initial hearing from A.P.A. procespecial inquiry officer shall conduct a proceeding in any case under this section in
which he shall have participated in investigative functions or in which he shall have
participated . .. in prosecuting functions." 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1970). A.P.A. sections 5(c)
and 7(a) also provide similar, although stricter, disqualification provisions. 5 U.S.C. §§
554(d), 556(b) (1970). The Giambanco majority failed to address the question of standards for disqualification, preferring instead to rest its decision upon representations of
the Board members, made in the affidavits, as to their impartiality. See Giambanco v.
INS, 531 F.2d at 143. Judge Gibbons, however, would have reversed and remanded the
causes to the Board for a further determination under the A.P.A. section 5(c) standard.
Id. at 155 (dissenting opinion); see text accompanying note 48 supra.
159 Giambanco v. INS, 531 F.2d at 153. The majority is mistaken at footnote 3 of its
opinion where it finds that the immigration hearing is merely subject to the due process
standard for separation of functions. Under section 242(b) stricter statutory protections
for disqualification of hearing officers have been mandated. Compare id. at 144 n.3
(majority opinion) with I.N.A. § 242(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1970). Flowing implictly
from the court's error is the conclusion that Board hearings are also subject to the more
lenient due process standard. The due process standard for separation of functions
which the majority would apply is that recently adopted by the Supreme Court in Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975). In Withrow, the Court held that the mere combination of adjudicative and investigative functions in one individual was not, without more,
violative of due process of the law. Id. at 58. The facts of this case revealed that an
examining board of physicians had investigated charges against Dr. Larkin, had conducted hearings, and had also made the determination that probable cause existed to
revoke Dr. Larkin's license. Id. at 38-42. A three-judge district court found this commingling of funtions to be unconstitutional as a violation of due process. Larkin v. Withrow, 368 F. Supp. 796, 797-98 (E.D. Wis. 1973), rev'd, 421.U.S. 35 (1975). Upon direct
appeal, the Supreme Court reversed in a unanimous opinion, finding that a "combination of ... functions" in one individual carries with it "a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators." 421 U.S. at 47. In order to rebut this presumption, a plaintiff must present "a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and
human weakness," showing that there is "a risk of actual bias or prejudgment" such
that failure to forbid the practice would place due process in jeopardy. Id. at 47 (emphasis added). The Court went on to note that there is "no support for the bald proposition . . . that agency members who participate in an investigation are disqualified from
adjudicating." Id. at 52; see 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 67, § 1302, at 175. See generally Davis,
Withrow v. Larkin and the "Separation of Functions" Concept in State Administrative
Proceedings, 27 AD. L. REV. 407 (1975); Comment, Prejudice and the Administrative
Process, 59 Nw. U.L. REV. 216 (1964); 35 MD. L. REV. 704 (1976).
160 Giambanco v. INS, 531 F.2d at 153.
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dures while allowing Board hearings to be within its ambit.161
Judge Gibbons further indicated that the legislative history suggests that Congress did not contemplate diminished protections upon
Board review. 162 Although there was extensive debate as to the applicability of the A.P.A. to the immigration act itself, little consideration was paid to the effect of the A.P.A. on the Board. 163 The
senatorial sponsor of both the A.P.A. and the I.N.A. did emphasize,
however, that "the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act
[were] made applicable to all proceedings before the Board of Immigration Appeals."' 164 The dissent indicated that this pronouncement
directly contradicted the majority's "assumption that greater procedural protections are afforded at hearings conducted by immigration
65
judges only because Congress expressly granted them in § 242(b)."'
Not content to rest his opinion on statutory interpretation alone,
Judge Gibbons believed that the most trenchant reasons compelling
A.P.A. governance of Board hearings were the "policy and purpose of
the APA" as first articulated "in the context of immigration proceedings in Wong Yang Sung."'166 Although the "impact" of that holding
has been eroded by passage of the 1952 immigration act and subsequent decisional law, there was no doubt in Judge Gibbons' mind, as
67
to the continuing vitality of its public policy analysis. 1
The dissent first noted that one of the fundamental remedial
purposes compelling promulgation of the A.P.A. was the abolition of
161Compare id. at 144-45 (majority opinion) with id. at 153 (Gibbons, J., dissent-

ing).
162Id. at 153 (dissenting opinion).

163 See 98 CONG. REC. 4302, 4414-16, 5329, 5417-21, 5604, 5618-19, 5625-26,
5778-88 (1952). Most of the discussion of the B.I.A. took place in the context of recommendations that it be replaced with a statutory entity. See id. at 4401, 5608, 5612-13,
5618-19.
164Id. at 5778 (remarks of Sen. McCarran). See also id. at 4302, 4414, 4416, 5329,
5778-79.
165 Giambanco v. INS, 531 F.2d at 153.
166 Id. at 154. The Wong Yang Sung Court had found that "[o]ne purpose was to
introduce greater uniformity of procedure and standarization of administrative practice
among the diverse agencies whose customs had departed widely from each other." 339
U.S. at 41. Justice Jackson indicated that the Court "pursue[d] this no further than to
note that any exception [it might] find to its applicability would tend to defeat this
purpose." Id. Another consideration given by the Court for the passage of the A.P.A.
was the need "to curtail and change the practice of embodying in one person or agency
the duties of prosecutor and judge." Id.
167Giambanco v. INS, 531 F.2d at 154. The impact of which Judge Gibbons speaks
is Wong Yang Sung's holding that the A.P.A. applies to immigration hearings. Id. Under
the Marcello v. Bonds interpretation of the I.N.A., such a result no longer obtains. 349
U.S. at 310.
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the then existing practice of commingling in one individual the
incompatible responsibilities "of advocacy and adjudication.' 6 8 The
history of the A.P.A.'s enactment was found to be replete with references to the effects that such a dual role has had on substantive judicial fairness and on the societal perception of, and confidence in,
agency process.' 69 Thus, as the dissent opined, once provided with
statutory reforms to insure procedural fairness, the courts must
"'construe

this remedial legislation to eliminate . . . the practices it
condemns.' "170 Judge Gibbons found the Wong Yang Sung Court's

objection to the commingling of functions no less compelling when
the level of adjudication has changed. Since the litigants involved in
immigration proceedings are noncitizens and may well be " 'strangers
to the laws and customis in which they find themselves involved,' " as
well as to the language of their triers, Judge Gibbons advocated their
protection equally at the hearing and review levels.171 Agreeing with
Justice Jackson's opinion in Wong Yang Sung, the dissenter in Giambanco concluded that because there is nothing inherent " 'in the nature of the parties or proceedings' " that would lead to exemption,
the court "should not hesitate to extend the procedural safeguards of
the APA to cases before the Board of Immigration Appeals."172
168 Giambanco v. INS, 531 F.2d at 154; see Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. at

41. In Wong Yang Sung, the Court quoted at length from a study undertaken "by a ...
committee named by the Secretary of Labor, whose jurisdiction at the time included the
Immigration and Naturalization Service." Id. at 42-44. It was observed in that study that
"[m]erely to provide that in particular cases different inspectors shall investigate and hear is an insufficient guarantee of insulation and independence
of the presiding official. The present organization of the field staff not only gives
work of both kinds commonly to the same inspector but tends toward an identity
of viewpoint as between inspectors who are chiefly doing only one or the other
kind of work .... "
Id. at 43 (emphasis added) (quoting from THE SECRETARY OF LABOR'S COMMITTEE ON
ADMINISTRATIVE

PROCEDURE,

THE IMMIGRATION AND

NATURALIZATION

SERVICE

81

(Mimeo. 1940)).
169 Giambanco v. INS, 531 F.2d at 151; see Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S.
at 36-39 & nn. 2-13 (extensive citation of sources criticizing this practice).
170 Giambanco v. INS, 531 F.2d at 154 (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (quoting from Wong
Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. at 45).
171 Giambanco v. INS, 531 F.2d at 154-55 (quoting from Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. at 46).
The Wong Yang Sung Court had recognized that arguments advanced against application of the A.P.A. to immigration proceedings could equally be applied to all other
agencies. The Court stated, however, that "[t]he agencies, unlike the aliens, have ready
and persuasive access to the legislative ear and if error is made by including them, relief from Congress is a simple matter." 339 U.S. at 46-47; see Giambanco v. INS, 531
F.2d at 155 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
172Giambanco v. INS, 531 F.2d at 154 (quoting from Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath,
339 U.S. at 46).
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To resolve whether the majority correctly extended the Marcello
holding to Board review, or whether the dissent was correct in viewing that holding as limited to initial hearings, it is necessary to examine the congressional intent behind the I.N.A. Only by conducting
such an examination can it be understood what limitations are inherent in Marcello's alteration of the A.P.A. language that deviations
from its terms must be express.173
What emerges from an analysis of the legislative history of the
I.N.A. is an indication that, contrary to the Giambanco majority's
conclusion, Congress did have a "disjointed . . . intent"'174 in mind

when it enacted that act into law. Both the House and Senate sponsors of the bill made clear in debate the fact that the A.P.A. was meant
to govern the administration of the immigration laws. 175 They further
indicated that the holding of Wong Yang Sung-that the A.P.A. applies to I.N.A. hearings-would be restored following its implicit
overruling by the Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1951.176 Contrary statements found in debate and in the House Report accompanying the passage of the I.N.A., which acknowledged that some
specialized immigration procedures had been developed, 177 are not
irreconcilable with a concurrent intention of making the A.P.A. applicable to Board hearings.
Further evidence of Congressional intent to submit Board review to A.P.A. requirements may be seen in an examination of immigration problems leading to passage of the I.N.A. Prior to this time,
the ability of an immigration officer to provide some form of discretionary relief to an alien was severely circumscribed by the addition
in 1940 of section 19(c) to the Immigration Act of 1917.178 According
to the terms of that section, one of the forms of relief available was a
six-month suspension of deportation by the Attorney General. 179 Because of the overwhelming problems involved in obtaining such relief,' 8 0 the number of aliens who received such discretion was ex1735 U.S.C. § 559 (1970).
174 Giambanco v. INS, 531 F.2d at 145.
17598 CONG. REC. 4302, 4414-16, 5329, 5778-88 (1952).
176 Id. at 4302, 4414, 4416, 5625-26.
177 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 55-58, reprinted in [1952] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1653, 1710-13, 1754; 98 CONG. REc. 5417-21, 5625 (1952).
8
17
Act of June 28, 1940, ch. 439, § 20(c), 54 Stat. 670, amending Act of Feb. 5, 1917,
ch. 29, § 19, 39 Stat. 874.
179Act of June 28, 1940, ch. 439, § 20(c)( 2 ), 54 Stat. 670. The only other relief available was the option of voluntary departure. See id. § 20(c)(1).
180 In order to be eligible for relief under section 19(c), an alien needed to demonstrate "good moral character for the preceding five years." Id. § 20(c). In addition he
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tremely limited. 18 1 In 1952, when Congress drafted the omnibus immigration act, it was cognizant of criticism voiced over the inequities
involved in such a procedure.' 8 2 It therefore provided for several additional mechanisms by which aliens could seek relief from orders of
deportation. 18 3 In light of the concern Congress had expressed over
by aliens, however, the
the deliberate evasion of immigration laws
184
stringent.
quite
were
standards for relief
Responding to concern by INS officials over the increased burdens which would be occasioned by application of the A.P.A. to deportation hearings,' 8 5 the sponsors of the I.N.A. incorporated a modified version of the A.P.A. hearing provisions to avoid the feared
difficulties. 186 What they did not do was to fashion a wholesale ex-

must be found not to be ineligible for naturalization. Id. § 20(c)(2). Deportation could
be suspended if these conditions were satisfied and it was found "that such deportation
would result in serious economic detriment to a citizen or legally resident alien who is
the spouse, parent, or minor child of such deportable alien." Id.
In order for deportation to be suspended for more than six months, Congress had to
approve affirmatively the suspension. Id. Until 1940, the Attorney General, acting alone,
had no discretion whatsoever to provide for permanent relief from expulsion. Deportation "was mandatory" and the "only avenue of relief in a hardship case was by a private
bill in Congress." Foti v. INS, 375 U.S. 217, 222-23 (1963).
181See Gordon, Ameliorating Hardships under the Immigration Laws, 367 ANNALS
85, 86-87 (1966).
182 Id.; see C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 7, § 7.1a, at 7-4 to -5. Congressional reaction was not limited to the year 1952; at subsequent intervals when the
Act was amended, other avenues of relief were provided. See id., at 7-5 to -6.
183Today there are a myriad of possible alternatives to deportation including, inter
alia, adjustment of status under I.N.A. § 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1970), suspension of
deportation under I.N.A. § 244, 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (1970), and waiver of grounds of excludability under I.N.A. § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1970). For an analysis of these and
other avenues of relief, see J. WASSERMAN, supra note 5, at 193-222. There are so many
remedies available to aliens "that, in most deportation proceedings today, the principal
issue is not whether the alien is deportable, which often is conceded, but rather
whether he is entitled to various discretionary dispensations." Gordon, supra note 181,
at 86-87.
184See, e.g., I.N.A. § 244(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1970). In speaking specifically of
this section, a House Report recognized the increase in illegal entry by aliens who later
attempted to have their status adjusted "to that of permanent resident." This report
further noted that
[t]his practice [was] threatening our entire immigration system and the incentive for the practice must be removed. Accordingly, under the bill, to justify the
suspension of deportation the hardship must not only be unusual but must also
be exceptionally and extremely unusual.
H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 62-63 (emphasis added), reprintedin [1952] U.S.

CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1653, 1718.
18596 CONG. REC. 13504-05, 13546-50 (1950). See also 98 CONG. REC. 5626 (1952).
186 98 CONG. REC. 5626 (1952). Senator McCarran, who sponsored both the A.P.A.

and the I.N.A., stated that the I.N.A. eliminated exemptions from the A.P.A. "in the case
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emption or modification of the A.P.A. as to other types of adjudications or hearings before the Board.' 8 7 The sponsors were explicit in
contending that the A.P.A. was meant to apply to "the administration
of the bill."' 18 8 As a result, when courts inthe past have discussed the
relationship of the A.P.A. to the I.N.A. in factual contexts outside
that of deportation adjudications, they have consistently applied
A.P.A. standards.' 89
In limiting the mirror provisions to deportation adjudications,
Congress apparently did not anticipate the burgeoning number of individuals seeking both discretionary relief and appeal to the Board.
Had such an increase been foreseen, perhaps the sponsors would
have undertaken a more general modification of the A.P.A., extending it to Board proceedings as well. This is mere speculation, however, since there is no indication in the legislative history that such
would have been the case.
The result in the Giambanco and Cisternas-Estay cases is clearly
questionable, since it effectively accomplishes a transformation of
Congress' inaction with regard to the Board into an affirmative inten-

tion to extend the I.N.A.'s exemption from the A.P.A.' 9 0 In addition,
the court drew this conclusion based on its erroneous perception of
the B.I.A. as a mere extension of the 242(b) deportation hearing. 19 1

of deportation proceedings, but accomplishe[d] such elimination with due regard for the
administrative problems of the Immigration and Naturalization Service by providing at
the same time the special procedures which these problems require." Id.
187See id. at 4302, 5329. Senator McCarran, in attacking a substitute amendment for
his I.N.A. proposal, indicated that he was opposed to "any and all blanket exemptions
from the Administrative Procedure Act." Id. at 5626 (emphasis added). The Senator felt
that there was no absolute exemption here, but that his mirror provisions were "in substantial compliance with the" A.P.A., "[e]xcept for the failure to comply strictly with
[its] dual-examiner provisions." Id. If there were "a blanket exemption, the agency
would prescribe its own procedures"--a result which did not obtain in the case of the
I.N.A. Id.
188 Id. at 5779.
189 See 531 F.2d at 144.
190 This rationale was rejected by the Supreme Court in Wong Yang Sung. 339 U.S.
at 47. Earlier, the INS had "asked Congress for exempting legislation ... which appropriate committees of both Houses reported favorably"; however, Congress took no
"further action." Id. (footnote omitted). In Wong Yang Sung, the Government contended that since Congress was aware of the construction of the Act by the INS and
" 'ha[d] taken no action indicating disagreement with that interpretation' . . . it 'is at
least arguable that Congress was prepared to specifically confirm the administrative
construction by clarifying legislation.' " Id. (quoting from an unidentified source). The
court responded by indicating that it "d[id] not think [it could] draw that inference from
incompleted steps in the legislative process." 339 U.S. at 47.
191See note 137 supra.
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In view of the fact that the apparent holding of Giambanco
leaves aliens with even fewer safeguards than those provided for section 242(b) hearings, the court should have moved more circumspectly. This is particularly so since procedural fairness is an indispensable element of the concept of liberty, and furthermore, since the
severe substantive nature of the immigration laws demands that they
be fairly and impartially applied. The agency involved in the instant
cases is more than an impartial adjudicator; it is a vitally interested
litigant. In such circumstances, the need for a more stringent separation of functions is self-evident.
Due process is a fluid concept that varies with the particular facts
and circumstances of each case. In any particular factual situation the
risk of unfairness in applying a lower standard of protection may be
too high to allow the procedure to stand. In cases concerning deportation or exclusionary relief surely a high degree of protection is required for conformity with due process, since the possible consequences, although denominated civil, are more akin to those resulting
from a criminal prosecution. 19 2 A litigant who stands before the B.I.A.
finds himself in a precarious situation where Board members can even
go so far as to make new findings of fact and institute additional
charges. As Judge Gibbons points out, however, the courts have been
apprised by the A.P.A. of the mood of Congress toward procedural
fairness. 1 93 It is this mood which should have been executed in the
absence of express indications to the contrary.
Thomas M. Lahiff, Jr.
192See Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922). In Ng Fung Ho, Justice Brandeis
formulated the now classic description of the consquences of deportation: it "obviously
deprives [the individual] of liberty .. . . It may result also in loss of both property and
life; or all that makes life worth living." Id. at 284.
193See Giambanco v. INS, 531 F.2d at 155 (dissenting opinion). In Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951), the Supreme Court indicated that Congress, by
passage of the A.P.A., had expressed "its mnood" of concern over procedural fairness and
regularity in administrative adjudication. See id.at 477-87. Thus, "[t]he APA . . .provides courts with a broad congressional judgment regarding administrative policy to
which they should refer in establishing rules of decision in this area, especially in cases
of first impression." Giambanco v. INS, 531 F.2d at 155 (dissenting opinion).

